




GERMANY

16,107

SURPRISE

SURPRISE

DISSEMINATIONS

GERMANY

SURPRISE

16,107

GERMANY

16,107

SUNRISE

SURPRISE

DISSEMINATIONS

GERMANY

SUNRISE

16,107

[Faint, illegible handwritten notes]

100

Dear General Donovan

I believe you have seen a copy of the letter which I wrote to Colonel Glavin on the 4th of May, telling him of my appreciation of the outstanding work performed by the members of the 257th Regiment in helping to bring about the surrender of the enemy forces in this Theatre. At such time as General McNarney may refer to me his recommendation to the War Department for the approval of a United States Distinguished Unit Citation to the Regiment, I shall be more than happy to add to it an indorsement along the lines of my letter to Colonel Glavin. There is, however, no British Award similar to the Distinguished Unit Citation.

It shows personal reports.

Yrs. sincerely
H. C. Alexander

Field Marshal,
Supreme Allied Commander,
Mediterranean Theatre.

Major General William J. Donovan, Director,
Office of Strategic Services,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
U.S.A.

SECRET

16,101

Germany

630 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

10 July 1945

Captain David C. Crockett
Bq 2677th Regt OSS Prov.
APO 512, N.Y.C.

In going through our files we have run across
attached document with marginal comments by the Director
which I recollect you handed to me in Caserta.

I assume that you have already taken action but
believe that said document properly belongs in your file
or files of the Awards Board, Caserta.


T. S. RYAN

Attached:

List of SUNRISE
persons

SECRET

SECRET

1007

1. ~~It is possible that there have been of considerable assistance in~~
~~the preparation and the~~
~~operation in~~
~~March and April~~

SECRET

MAJOR ENRICO FERRIOLI - Genova, Italy. (Italian National)

Italian industrialist of Genova and Milan. He deserves outstanding credit for having established the original contact between General WOLFF and the Swiss intermediaries. He made many trips from the Swiss border to Wolff's headquarters at Facano and from there to Milan. He undertook these trips at considerable personal risk.

MAJOR MAX WAIBEL - Luzern, Switzerland. (Swiss National)

Major in the Swiss Army, head of the German Branch in the Swiss Secret Intelligence organization. Through his active cooperation he made it possible that Italian and German emissaries and OSB-W/T operators could enter and leave Switzerland. He undertook this task under difficult circumstances, as for reasons of security he alone had to shoulder the responsibility for his action, which, if unsuccessful, might have entailed rather unpleasant political and personal consequences. He was responsible for establishing the first contact between the Italian intermediary and American representatives in Switzerland.

"WALTER" (Swiss National)

OSB radio operator who was first infiltrated to Milan and later on to General Wolff's headquarters at Bolzano to

SECRET

...with US, Canada. He performed his duties under difficult circumstances and at considerable personal risk. He deserves outstanding credit as the establishment and maintenance of W/T communications was an all important requisite for the successful conclusion of SWIRISS.

MR. HERRICH - Herrich, Switzerland (Swiss National)

Well-known Swiss educator. Deserves considerable credit for having influenced General WOITZ in many laborious talks, that unconditional surrender was the only course left for the German forces in Northern Italy and that the quicker surrender could be brought about the better it would be for all concerned. He deserves considerable credit for the successful conclusion of SWIRISS.

CAPTAIN MAYR v. ALDRICH - Lugern, Switzerland. (Swiss National)

Captain in the Swiss Army and aid to Major VAIBEL. He deserves recognition for his faithful cooperation with Major VAIBEL in the task for enabling emissaries and W/T operators to enter and leave Switzerland in connection with SWIRISS.

MR. JONES - Lugano, Switzerland. (American Citizen)

Attached to the American Consulate at Lugano. He deserves considerable credit for having organized the rescue of General WOITZ, when the latter's villa at Cernobbio was surrounded by Italian partisans. There can be little doubt that had WOITZ not been able to return to Bolzano the surrender of German Armies in Italy under the terms of the armistice signed in Casserta on 29 April 1945, and setting 8 May 1945, as the date for the surrender would not

SECRET

have been carried out.

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ERICT BLUNCE - Bern, Switzerland. (American Citizen) CAPT. U.S. ARMY.

Attached to the American Legation, Bern. Was of considerable assistance in conveying emissaries and W/T operators through Switzerland.

HARRY LUNNIN - Bern, Switzerland. (British Subject)

Secretary to G.V. Gubernits who worked devotedly to make **SUNSHINE** a success.

ALIDA MATCHINSIJK - Aesona, Switzerland. (Dutch National)

Was largely responsible for maintaining perfect security in Aesona during and especially after the meetings. As a result, the meetings were kept a complete secret in spite of the comparatively large number of persons who had come to Aesona in connection therewith.

ALFRED NOTHPELTYZ - Lucern, Switzerland. (Swiss National)

First Lieutenant in the Swiss Army. He accompanied many times emissaries and their staffs and W/T operators from the Swiss border to the meeting place in Aesona. He was particularly helpful in providing protection for the setting up of W/T transmitter at Aesona.

WEND GABNER - Bern, Switzerland. (American Citizen)

Clerk in the American Legation, Bern and secretary to G.V. GUBERNITS. She acted as secretary during the meetings at Aesona and worked hard to make **SUNSHINE** a success.

SECRET

SECRET**GROUP 1**

German emissaries who at considerable personal risk established and maintained contacts with American representatives in Switzerland.

General Karl WOLFF

Standartenfuhrer DOEMANN

Major WENNER

Oberstleutnant v. SCHWEINIZ

Guido ZIDNER

*No
handwritten
only - brief
+ summary
in
int. file*

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
857TH REGIMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (PROVISIONAL)
APO 612, U.S. ARMY

4 June 1945

SUBJECT: Letters of Commendation

TO : The Director,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D.C.

1. Letters of Commendation have been sent by the
Commanding Officer, 857th Regiment OSS (Prov) to the
following individuals, commending them for their contribu-
tions to Operation SUNRISE:

Sgt. Robert G. Layer
T/4 Gail F. Donnalley
T/4 Lloyd H. Jewell
Cpl. Lynn Keyser
Cpl. William D. Eselinger
Cpl. George E. Wilcox
T/6 Gregory Rabassa
T/6 Lowell Burmaster
Miss Marian L. Cooley
Miss Marjorie M. McCormick

2. Five (5) photostat copies of each letter are trans-
mitted herewith for your information.

Earle J. Carleton
EARLE J. CARLETON
Captain, P.A.
PLOS

Incl.
ltr to Sgt. Layer (5)
ltr to T/4 Donnalley (5)
ltr to T/4 Jewell (5)
ltr to Cpl. Keyser (5)
ltr to Cpl. Eselinger (5)
ltr to Cpl. Wilcox (5)
ltr to T/6 Rabassa (5)
ltr to T/6 Burmaster (5)
ltr to Miss Cooley (5)
ltr to Miss McCormick (5)

✓ D

HEADQUARTERS
2677TH REGIMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (PROV.)
APO 512, U.S. ARMY

29 May 1945

201

SUBJECT: Commendation

TO : Sgt. Robert G. Laver

1. It gives me great pleasure to commend you for your superior performance of duty during the critical period of 9 March 1945 through 8 May 1945, at which time this organization was playing its important part in the negotiations leading to the surrender of the German forces in Italy.

2. The 2677th Regiment, Office of Strategic Services (Provisional) has received official commendation for its contributions in effecting the surrender of the enemy in Italy by Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, General Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, and Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Deputy Chief of Staff, Mediterranean Theater of Operations. Your devotion to duty, necessitating extra hours of work in addition to your normal duties, and your careful and continued observance of all security precautions, deserve special recognition for their valued contributions to the success of these negotiations.

3. I have instructed the Adjutant to place a copy of this commendation in your 201 file as part of your official record.


EDWARD J. B. GLAVIN
Colonel, Infantry,
Commanding

**HEADQUARTERS
267TH REGIMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (PROVISIONAL)
APO 612, U.S. ARMY**

29 May 1945

201

SUBJECT: Commendation

TO : T/4 (all F. Downalley

1. It gives me great pleasure to commend you for your superior performance of duty during the critical period of 9 March 1945 through 2 May 1945, at which time this organization was playing its important part in the negotiations leading to the surrender of the German forces in Italy.
2. The 267th Regiment, Office of Strategic Services (Provisional) has received official commendation for its contributions in effecting the surrender of the enemy in Italy by Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, General Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, and Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Deputy Chief of Staff, Mediterranean Theater of Operations. Your devotion to duty, necessitating extra hours of work in addition to your normal duties, and your careful and continued observance of all security precautions, deserve special recognition for their valued contributions to the success of these negotiations.
3. I have instructed the Adjutant to place a copy of this commendation in your 201 file as part of your official records.


EDWARD J. GLAVIN
Colonel, Infantry,
Commanding

**HEADQUARTERS
2677TH REGIMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (PROVISIONAL)
APO 612, U. S. ARMY**

29 May 1945

201

SUBJECT: Commendation

TO : T/4 Lloyd H. Jewell

1. It gives me great pleasure to commend you for your superior performance of duty during the critical period of 8 March 1945 through 2 May 1945, at which time this organization was playing its important part in the negotiations leading to the surrender of the German forces in Italy.

2. The 2677th Regiment, Office of Strategic Services (Provisional) has received official commendation for its contributions in effecting the surrender of the enemy in Italy by Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, General Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, and Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Deputy Chief of Staff, Mediterranean Theater of Operations. Your devotion to duty, necessitating extra hours of work in addition to your normal duties, and your careful and continued observance of all security precautions, deserve special recognition for their valued contributions to the success of these negotiations.

3. I have instructed the Adjutant to place a copy of this commendation in your 201 file as part of your official record.


EDWARD J. OLAVIN
Colonel, Infantry,
Commanding

**HEADQUARTERS
267TH REGIMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (PROVISIONAL)
APO 512, U.S. ARMY**

29 May 1945

EO1

SUBJECT: Commendation

TO : Opl. Lynn Keyser

1. It gives me great pleasure to commend you for your superior performance of duty during the critical period of 9 March 1945 through 2 May 1945, at which time this organization was playing its important part in the negotiations leading to the surrender of the German forces in Italy.

2. The 267th Regiment, Office of Strategic Services (Provisional) has received official commendation for its contributions in effecting the surrender of the enemy in Italy by Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, General Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, and Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Deputy Chief of Staff, Mediterranean Theater of Operations. Your devotion to duty, necessitating extra hours of work in addition to your normal duties, and your careful and continued observance of all security precautions, deserve special recognition for their valued contributions to the success of these negotiations.

3. I have instructed the Adjutant to place a copy of this commendation in your EO1 file as part of your official record.


EDWARD J. P. OLAVIN
Colonel, Infantry,
Commanding

**HEADQUARTERS
267TH REGIMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (PROVISIONAL)
APO 612, U.S. ARMY**

29 May 1946

NO1

SUBJECT: Commendation

TO : Cpl. William B. Esslinger

1. It gives me great pleasure to commend you for your superior performance of duty during the critical period of 9 March 1946 through 2 May 1946, at which time this organization was playing its important part in the negotiations leading to the surrender of the German forces in Italy.

2. The 267th Regiment, Office of Strategic Services (Provisional) has received official commendation for its contributions in effecting the surrender of the enemy in Italy by Field Marshal Sir Harold M. L. G. Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, General Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, and Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Deputy Chief of Staff, Mediterranean Theater of Operations. Your devotion to duty, necessitating extra hours of work in addition to your normal duties, and your careful and continued observance of all security precautions, deserve special recognition for their valued contributions to the success of these negotiations.

3. I have instructed the Adjutant to place a copy of this commendation in your NO1 file as part of your official record.


EDWARD J. GLAVIN
Colonel, Infantry,
Commanding

HEADQUARTERS
8677TH REGIMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (PROVISIONAL)
APO 612, U.S. ARMY

20 May 1946

EOI

SUBJECT: Commendation

TO : Cpl. George E. Wilcox

1. It gives me great pleasure to commend you for your superior performance of duty during the critical period of 6 March 1946 through 2 May 1946, at which time this organization was playing its important part in the negotiations leading to the surrender of the German forces in Italy.

2. The 8677th Regiment, Office of Strategic Services (Provisional) has received official commendation for its contributions in effecting the surrender of the enemy in Italy by Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, General Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, and Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Deputy Chief of Staff, Mediterranean Theater of Operations. Your devotion to duty, necessitating extra hours of work in addition to your normal duties, and your careful and continued observance of all security precautions, deserve special recognition for their valued contributions to the success of these negotiations.

3. I have instructed the Adjutant to place a copy of this commendation in your EOI file as part of your official record.


EDWARD J. OLAVIN
Colonel, Infantry,
Commanding

HEADQUARTERS
2677TH REGIMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (PROVISIONAL)
APO 612, U.S. ARMY

29 May 1946

201

SUBJECT: Commendation

TO : T/S Gregory Rabassa

1. It gives me great pleasure to commend you for your superior performance of duty during the critical period of 9 March 1946 through 8 May 1946, at which time this organization was playing its important part in the negotiations leading to the surrender of the German forces in Italy.

2. The 2677th Regiment, Office of Strategic Services (Provisional) has received official commendation for its contributions in effecting the surrender of the enemy in Italy by Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, General Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, and Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Deputy Chief of Staff, Mediterranean Theater of Operations. Your devotion to duty, necessitating extra hours of work in addition to your normal duties, and your careful and continued observance of all security precautions, deserve special recognition for their valued contributions to the success of these negotiations.

3. I have instructed the Adjutant to place a copy of this commendation in your 201 file as part of your official record.


EDWARD J. P. OLAVIN
Colonel, Infantry,
Commanding

HEADQUARTERS
2077TH REGIMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (PROVISIONAL)
APO 612 U.S. ARMY

26 May 1945

201

SUBJECT: Commendation

TO : T/S Lowell Burmaster

1. It gives me great pleasure to commend you for your superior performance of duty during the critical period of 2 March 1945 through 2 May 1945, at which time this organization was playing its important part in the negotiations leading to the surrender of the German forces in Italy.
2. The 2077th Regiment, Office of Strategic Services (Provisional) has received official commendation for its contributions in effecting the surrender of the enemy in Italy by Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, General Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, and Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Deputy Chief of Staff, Mediterranean Theater of Operations. Your devotion to duty, necessitating extra hours of work in addition to your normal duties, and your careful and continued observance of all security precautions, deserve special recognition for their valued contributions to the success of these negotiations.
3. I have instructed the Adjutant to place a copy of this commendation in your 201 file as part of your official record.


EDWARD J. F. OLAVIN
Colonel, Infantry,
Commanding

HEADQUARTERS
2677TH REGIMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (PROVISIONAL)
APO 312, U.S. ARMY

29 May 1945

801

SUBJECT: Commendation

TO : Miss Marian L. Cooley

1. It gives me great pleasure to commend you for your superior performance of duty during the critical period of 8 March 1945 through 8 May 1945, at which time this organization was playing its important part in the negotiations leading to the surrender of the German forces in Italy.

2. The 2677th Regiment, Office of Strategic Services (Provisional) has received official commendation for its contributions in effecting the surrender of the enemy in Italy by Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, General Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, and Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Deputy Chief of Staff, Mediterranean Theater of Operations. Your devotion to duty, necessitating extra hours of work in addition to your normal duties, and your careful and continued observance of all security precautions, deserve special recognition for their valued contributions to the success of these negotiations.

3. I have instructed the Adjutant to place a copy of this commendation in your 801 file as part of your official record.


EDWARD J. V. OLAVIN
Colonel, Infantry,
Commanding

HEADQUARTERS
267TH REGIMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (PROVISIONAL)
APO 512, U.S. ARMY

20 May 1946

201

SUBJECT: Commendation

TO : Miss Marjorie M. McCormick

1. It gives me great pleasure to commend you for your superior performance of duty during the critical period of 9 March 1945 through 2 May 1945, at which time this organization was playing its important part in the negotiations leading to the surrender of the German forces in Italy.

2. The 267th Regiment, Office of Strategic Services (Provisional) has received official commendation for its contributions in effecting the surrender of the enemy in Italy by Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, General Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, and Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Deputy Chief of Staff, Mediterranean Theater of Operations. Your devotion to duty, necessitating extra hours of work in addition to your normal duties, and your careful and continued observance of all security precautions, deserve special recognition for their valued contributions to the success of these negotiations.

3. I have instructed the Adjutant to place a copy of this commendation in your 201 file as part of your official record.


EDWARD J. OLAVIN
Colonel, Infantry,
Commanding

CONFIDENTIAL

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff
 A. R. O. III

15 May 1945

Major General William J. Donovan,
 Office of Strategic Services,
 Washington, D. C.

Dear General:

I wish to express to you my deep appreciation and admiration for the outstanding work of the Office of Strategic Services during the SWITZERLAND operation.

It was my good fortune to have participated in that operation and I am, therefore, familiar with the many additional duties and functions placed on the OSA agencies in SWITZERLAND and in ITALY, and also with the highly commendable manner with which they were carried out by all concerned.

The work of Allan B. PULLER was particularly outstanding. His establishment of the original contacts in SWITZERLAND and his management of subsequent conferences and discussions were accomplished with rare skill and sound judgment. Great credit is due to the thoroughness and efficiency with which he handled the many complex details of frontier passage, security, and the many movements of personnel and equipment from one place to another in SWITZERLAND. Throughout the entire period, he and his staff worked long hours, often under the most trying conditions, and were always most cooperative and helpful to General ALBY, myself, and to Allied Force Headquarters.

Mr. PULLER was very ably assisted by Mr. Gero von GALVERNITZ. His knowledge of the German language and German psychology made him invaluable in this operation. His tactful and diplomatic handling of the various personalities involved contributed much to the success of the operation. Mr. von GALVERNITZ accompanied the German plenipotentiaries from SWITZERLAND to Allied Force Headquarters and return. His cooperation and assistance at the official AFHQ conferences, and particularly during the important detailed conversations with the plenipotentiaries between the official conferences, was of great value to us all.

- 1 -

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Colonel Edward J. F. GLAVIN and the 2677th Regiment also contributed much to the success of the SUNRISE-CROSSWORD Operation. The heavy additional signal traffic was handled efficiently, plans for movement and accommodation were well prepared and efficiently executed, and complete security was maintained throughout the entire Operation.

In the foregoing, I have attempted to give credit to those members of your organization with whom I had direct contact and who, in my opinion, played outstanding parts in the SUNRISE-CROSSWORD Operation. The greatest credit, however, belongs to you and the Office of Strategic Services for having in existence the organization, trained personnel and the means required to take full advantage of the situation and to carry the SUNRISE-CROSSWORD Operation through to such a successful conclusion. Aside from the important intelligence and operational roles played by OSS in this war, your organization has also played a vital part in bringing about the unconditional surrender of the German forces in Northern ITALY and Southern AUSTRIA, which did so much to hasten the complete collapse of the entire German Army and the German Government. By this action on the part of OSS, the war in Europe has been brought to a successful conclusion much earlier than would have otherwise been possible, with the consequent saving of many lives and much treasure.

Sincerely,

L. L. Lemnitzer

L. L. LEMNITZER
Major General, U.S.C.
Deputy Chief of Staff

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

1st Ind.

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ, APO 512, U. S. Army, 19 May 1945.

TO: Commanding Officer, 2677th Regt., Office of Strategic Services (Prov),
APO 512, U. S. Army.


FROM: Commanding General, MTOUSA, APO 512, U. S. Army.

1. In transmitting the attached letter of commendation from the Supreme Allied Commander, I desire to add thereto my own appreciation for the cooperation and assistance given me by you and your organization throughout the period referred to.

2. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ, was the direct link between OSS and Allied Force Headquarters during these operations and I am, therefore, fully aware of the heavy additional duties placed on you, Mr. Ryan and the other personnel of your organization. The smoothness and efficiency with which these duties were carried out were largely responsible for the ultimate success of the operations which resulted in the surrender of the German forces in Northern ITALY and Southern AUSTRIA.

3. The dependability and accuracy of your signal communications were noteworthy as was also the high degree of security maintained throughout the operations. The handling of the detailed arrangements for movements of personnel and equipment from ITALY into SWITZERLAND and return is equally commendable.

4. This fine performance of duty reflects the greatest credit upon you and the personnel of the 2677th Regiment, OSS. It is indicative of sound organization, thorough training, and outstanding devotion to duty on the part of all concerned.




L. L. LEMMITZER
Major General, G.S.C.
Deputy Chief of Staff

24 Ind

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL, MTOUSA, APO 512, U. S. Army, 23 May 1945.

TO: Commanding Officer, 2677th Regiment, Office of Strategic Services (Prov),
APO 512, U. S. Army.

I am very pleased to transmit the foregoing and add my commendation.



JOSEPH T. MCNAMARA,
General, U. S. Army,
Inspection 111g.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Supreme Allied Commander

4th May, 1945.

**To: Commanding Officer,
 2677th Regiment, OSS.**

**From: Field Marshal The Hon Sir H.R.L.G. Alexander,
 GCB, CSI, DSO, MC, ADC,
 Supreme Allied Commander,
 Mediterranean Theatre.**

I wish to express to you, to Mr. Ryan, and to all personnel, both civilian and military, of 2677th Regiment, OSS, my keen appreciation of the outstanding work of your regiment in the course of the negotiations which have finally resulted in the unconditional surrender of the enemy nation.

For a period of two months, this considerable addition to your normal activities must have placed a very heavy strain on your staff, but the cheerful and efficient manner in which the extra work has been carried out, and the complete security which has been maintained, reflect very great credit on your organisation.

I have no doubt that, by the work of 2677th Regiment, OSS, many lives have been saved, and I should be grateful if you would, on my behalf, thank all concerned for their splendid efforts.

H. R. Alexander

**Field Marshal,
 Supreme Allied Commander,
 Mediterranean Theatre.**

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : General Donovan
 FROM : Executive Office
 SUBJECT :

DATE: 6 May 1945

I attach a draft memorandum to the President on SUNSHINE. This is purely for its idea value. When I told him of it, Ned told me you wanted to wait until the full history had been received. However, it seemed that we might consider making the point briefly ^{at this time} in a note which would not have a formidable document attached to it.

RT

Let's start

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

8 May 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I attach a cabled report from our representative in Switzerland which provides an interesting footnote to the surrender in Italy. We have found in all our work that the communications man often is the key to the success of a mission. When the complete records of the negotiations are received, I shall have the whole story prepared for you and the White House records.

The following additional facts may also be of interest: The series of cables on this subject between Bern and Washington was identified by the code indicator SUMRISSE. The OSS representative in Switzerland who was principally responsible for this accomplishment is Allen Dulles. He has other accomplishments to his credit, one of which is considered by the British the outstanding intelligence achievement of this war. His work is worthy of the highest recognition.

William J. Donovan
Director

TOP SECRET

2 May 1945

General Donovan:

In accordance with your request, we attach for your signature memoranda for the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, further dealing with negotiations for the surrender of German armed forces in North Italy. (Bern cable #9649, of 1 May.)

For General Magruder

C. T., Jr.

ccv JH

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS - Intelligence Service

105161

3 May 1945

Conway
TOP SECRET

Miss Rose Conway
The White House

Dear Miss Conway:

The President will probably be interested in the enclosed memorandum, containing intelligence transmitted by our representative in Bern.

Will you be good enough to see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET**2 May 1945****MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern on 1 May, is a sequel to previous memoranda concerning negotiations for the surrender of German forces in North Italy:

After every possible vicissitude, the surrender negotiations appear again to be progressing. There is some prospect of results within the next 48 hours or less. OSS Bern has been in almost hourly contact with AFHQ on almost all details and has played a vital part in keeping up essential lines of communication. OSS Bern has succeeded in getting Lieutenant-Colonel Victor von Schwelnitz (von Vietinghoff's deputy) and Stabschef Werner (Wolff's deputy) back to Bolzano with the surrender terms which they had signed at Cassino for their respective commanders. Final acceptance and execution of these terms now rests with von Vietinghoff and Wolff.

William J. Donovan
Director

Bern Cable #9649 (IN 11943) - 5/1/45.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET**2 May 1945****MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION
FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:****SUBJECT: Negotiations Pertaining to the
Surrender of German Armed Forces.**

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern on 1 May, is a sequel to previous memoranda concerning negotiations for the surrender of German forces in North Italy:

After every possible vicissitude, the surrender negotiations appear again to be progressing. There is some prospect of results within the next 48 hours or less. OSS Bern has been in almost hourly contact with ARHQ on almost all details and has played a vital part in keeping up essential lines of communication. OSS Bern has succeeded in getting Lieutenant-Colonel Victor von Schminitz (von Vietinghoff's deputy) and Sturmbannführer Kemmer (Hoff's deputy) back to Bolzano with the surrender terms which they had signed at Casserta for their respective commands. Final acceptance and execution of these terms now rests with von Vietinghoff and Hoff.

**William J. Donovan
Director**

Data Cable 00649 (IR 11943) - 3/1/45.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

28 April 1945

General Donovan:

Attached for your signature are
memoranda addressed to the President
and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, fur-
ther concerning negotiations pertaining
to the surrender of German armed forces.
(Horn cable #9499, 28 April.)

For General Magruder

C. T., Jr.

per JH

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, ONI - Intelligence Service

TOP SECRET

28 April 1945

Mr. Ross Conroy
The White House

Dear Mr. Conroy:

I believe the President will be interested in the enclosed message from our representative in Bern. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.

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16 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern on 20 April, concerns negotiations for a German surrender in North Italy, and is supplementary to memoranda of 14 April.

Weather permitting, Lieutenant-Colonel von Schweinitz, von Vietinghoff's deputy, with full power to act for his superior, and Hauptmann Friedrich Wanner, Wolff's adjutant, with full power to act for his superior, were scheduled to arrive in Caserta on 23 April.

There have been no discussions with von Schweinitz or Wanner in Switzerland, except in regard to communications. The OSS representative believes that von Schweinitz is capable and that Wanner, although not a forceful character, might be useful to "rubber stamp" the surrender of Wolff's forces. OSS representatives are being sent to Buchs on the Swiss-Liechtenstein frontier, and preparations are made to infiltrate a communications unit to Bolzano, headquarters of Wolff and von Vietinghoff, if required.

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A message from Berlin via Moscow from von Delft's inter-
 military relations states that Delft had reached Bonn safely on 27
 April after leaving Switzerland on 23 April, and had a long
 talk with his associates, all of whom adhere to the previous
 decision to surrender. They are awaiting results of the trip
 to Geneva by von Schrenk and Gerner.

William J. Donovan
 Director

Dom Cable 09499 (DI 11640) - 4/28/45.

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24 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

SUBJECT: Negotiations Pertaining to the
Surrender of German Armed Forces.

The following information, transmitted by the OCS representative in Bern on 23 April, concerns negotiations for a German surrender in North Italy, and is supplementary to the OCS Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 April 1945:

Further permitting, Lieutenant-Colonel von Schmeinitz (Gey, Vietinghoff's deputy, with full power to act for his superior) and Sturmbannführer Younger (Wolff's adjutant, with full power to act for his superior) were scheduled to arrive in Geneva on 23 April.

There have been no discussions with von Schmeinitz or Younger in Switzerland, except in regard to communications. The OCS representative believes that von Schmeinitz is capable and that Younger, although not a powerful character, might be useful to "rubber stamp" the surrender of Wolff's forces. OCS representatives are being sent to Duomo (see the Kreis-Lichtenstein French) and preparatory work is being done to infiltrate a communication team into German headquarters of Wolff and von Vietinghoff, if required.

A message from Duomo via Basel (one of Wolff's intermediaries) states that Wolff had reached Bolzano safely on 27 April, after leaving Switzerland on 25 April, and had a long talk with his associates, all of whom adhere to the previous decision to surrender. They are awaiting results of the trip to Geneva by von Schmeinitz and Younger.

William J. Donovan
Director

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JCS 1349 (21 11410) - 4/24/45.

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10 April 1945

Miss Anne Conway
The White House

Dear Miss Conway:

I think the President will be interested in the enclosed memorandum, which is a summary of developments in the negotiations for the surrender of German armed forces in North Italy.

Will you be good enough to see that it reaches him quickly? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.

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20 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following summary of information, concerning negotiations for the surrender of German forces in North Italy during the period 19-27 April, is supplementary to two previous memoranda dated 18 April 1945.

Salfer reached Berlin on 15 April. After conferences with Keitel, Jodl, Himmler and Hitler, he returned to his former headquarters on 19 April. On 21 April, he called on Generaloberst von Vietinghoff, Commander of the German forces in Italy, and on Franz Buer, Controller of Tiroi, and received assurances of their full support. He arrived in Switzerland on 23 April with his adjutant, Sommer, and with Lieutenant-Colonel Viktor von Scheinichen (who had papers to call for von Vietinghoff).

Meanwhile, on 20 April the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed CIG to work off all contacts with Salfer, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved a message to this effect to CIG, stating that von Vietinghoff clearly did not intend to surrender his forces on acceptable terms at that time.

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On 20 April, the OSS representative was unable to comply with these instructions since no representative of Wolff was at hand. On 23 April, an emissary arrived, and the OSS representative told him, in the presence of Swiss intelligence officers, that the matter was no longer of interest to the Allies. Wolff's intermediary stated that Wolff and von Schweinitz had come to Bellinzona to negotiate a surrender, and said that another emissary had been sent to Marshal Kesselring to try to persuade him to surrender simultaneously.

As a result of the OSS representative's refusal to see him, Wolff returned to North Italy on 25 April, leaving Banner with full powers to sign or act in his behalf. Wolff declared to Swiss officers that his presence in Italy was imperative in order to control the situation there, and to persuade von Vietinghoff, Rudolf Hess (the German Ambassador to North Italy), and Gerd von Roon to join him in a joint proclamation to the German forces in North Italy. The proclamation would announce that since the Italian theater now is separated from the High Command, independent action will be taken to end hostilities.

On 26 April, the OSS directed SACMED to instruct the OSS representative to hold no conferences but to re-establish

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contact, and that arrangements would be made for Wolff and von
Schunhardt to proceed at once to AFHQ. Wolff was already en
route to his new headquarters in Bolzano, but Wenner and von
Schunhardt were intercepted in Switzerland.

Subsequent developments are contained in a
separate accompanying memorandum.7

William J. Donovan
Director

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27 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

SUBJECT: Negotiations Pertaining to the Surrender of German Armed Forces.

- REFERENCE:** (a) OSS Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 24 April 1945.
- (b) OSS Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 25 April 1945.
- (c) OSS Memorandum of Information for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 25 April 1945.

The following is supplementary to reference memoranda:

The OSS representative in Bern, on 26 April, cabled as follows:

"1. Wolff (a Swiss Intelligence officer) reports that, as a result of my refusal to have any contact with Wolff, Wolff returned to North Italy on the evening of 25 April. His return was also motivated by his belief that his presence in North Italy was essential in order to control the situation there. He feels he must be in North Italy at this time in order to be certain that his personal orders to protect political prisoners and to avoid the destruction of Italian factories and power plants are carried out, in compliance with the promises he had given us in Munich. Wolff also told Wolff that Hitler or Himmler might suddenly arrive by plane in his territory and attempt to take over command, and that he had to prepare counter-measures to meet such an eventuality.

"2. Lieutenant Colonel Victor von Scheinits (von Vietinghoff's representative with powers to act) and General Wolff's adjutant will remain at Wolff's house in Lugano. Prior to

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His signature Wolff left with Tamar, written on official stationery, a document giving Tamar full powers to act and sign in Wolff's behalf. Mussolini and Tamar are prepared to proceed immediately to AFHQ with powers, if AFHQ desires them to do so. They expect to remain in Lugano one or two more days before returning to Italy.

3. Wolff, upon his return to Italy, will propose to von Vietinghoff that they issue a joint proclamation to the German forces in North Italy and South Tirol, announcing that the Italian theater now is separated from the German High Command and that independent action will therefore be taken to end the fighting, to avoid senseless bloodshed and destruction and futile wasteful warfare in the "redoubt". Wolff will propose that Rudolph Rahn (the German Ambassador to North Italy) and Franz Bader (the Gauleiter of Tirol) sign the proclamation in addition to von Vietinghoff and himself.

4. Wolff will also urge von Vietinghoff to send negotiators across the lines, in spite of the uncertainties involved, who could use the password "Hirshberg" as previously suggested. (Weibel does not favor this alternative as he thinks that von Schunthaner is particularly suited for the assignment of going to AFHQ.)

5. According to reports received by Weibel directly from Italy late 25 April, Mussolini had just completed a three-hour conference with Cardinal Schuster of Milan regarding the evacuation of the city. Following the conference Cardinal Schuster tried to reach Wolff but could not find him, as Wolff was in Switzerland.

A later cable from the OSS representative, dated 26 April, was received as follows:

6. Weibel further reports that Wolff reached Como the evening of 26 April but found further progress impossible since all the roads out of Como had been cut by the Partisans, including the road he had just come down from Como back to Chiasso.

7. A reliable source in Lugano reports that Mussolini and other high Fascist officials are trapped in Como and that while

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There is still held by the Panchito, the surrounding territory is in Panchito hands. I am as yet unable to confirm independently Panchito's presence in Cuzco."

Based on instructions received from the Secretary of The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the following cable was dispatched on 26 April to the OSS representative:

"1. JCS has dispatched a cable to SACRED directing him to instruct us to inform Parrilli that arrangements will be made for Wolff and his companion to go to AFHQ immediately.

"2. He was called in to insure that there would be no conference or discussion in Switzerland. Wolff and his companion must proceed to AFHQ at once or the whole matter is off. The Russians have been informed of the fact that this is being done at Germany's request, and SACRED has been instructed to invite a Russian representative to the meeting.

"3. This is to inform you of the situation so that you can be ready when the message comes."

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

Sam Cohen:

0220 (IN 11437) - 4/26/45
0221 (IN 11437) - 4/26/45
0222 (OUT 9105) - 4/26/45

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27 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

SUBJECT: Regulations Pertaining to the Surrender of German Armed Forces.

REFERENCE: JCS Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 27 April 1945.

The following cable, supplementary to reference memorandum, was dispatched by the GII representative in Bern on 27 April:

"1. I am taking immediate steps to comply with your instructions as stated in reference memorandum and those in three messages received from AFHQ.

"2. The messages from AFHQ instructed that only Lieutenant-Colonel Victor von Schweigitz (von Vietinghoff's deputy) and Vanner (Wolff's adjutant) be sent to Caserta. This was possibly because of the information I gave that Wolff was located at Cassino. Subsequently, however, Wolff managed to escape himself from Cassino and is now proceeding across Swiss-German border at Buchs (on the Swiss-Liechtenstein frontier) and travel via Feldkirch to his new headquarters at Bolzano, where von Vietinghoff has also established his new headquarters.

"3. Schweigitz and Vanner were en route from Lodi to Innsbruck when I received the messages in paragraph 1. To keep to Innsbruck they and send Schweigitz and Vanner to Caserta. If no one successful, arrangements can probably be made for them to leave Saturday morning.

"4. Your instructions have been carefully noted. There will be no conference here."

Charles S. Chilton
Acting Director

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Ref: 9419 (IN 11500) - 4/27/45

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27 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL McFARLAND**SUBJECT: Further Information Concerning Possible
Surrender of German Forces in North Italy**

The attached memoranda of 19 and 20 April concerning the above subject were ready for delivery on the morning of 20 April. They were not delivered because the JCS memorandum of that date made them of academic interest only. However, in view of subsequent developments, it seems desirable that you have these memoranda to complete your files.

E. J. Purzell, Jr.
Lieut. (J.G.) USMC
Acting Executive Officer

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20 April 1945

**MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION
FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:****SUBJECT: Further Negotiations for the Possible
Surrender of German Forces in Italy.**

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, is a sequel to previous memoranda concerning efforts by Obergruppenfuhrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff to arrange the surrender of German forces in North Italy:

Zimmer, one of Wolff's emissaries who was instructed by Wolff to remain at the Chiasso frontier to await developments, reported that Wolff reached Berlin by air the night of 16 April. He had travelled by plane from North Italy to Prague via Munich. Following his arrival he telephoned his headquarters at Passau that his conversations in Berlin were proceeding satisfactorily and that he planned to return to Passau shortly.

On 18 April, according to Zimmer, Wolff's aide at Passau received a telegram from Wolff stating that he was to have a final conference with Hitler that afternoon and expected to leave immediately afterwards by plane for Passau. Wolff was expected back at his headquarters by early morning of 19 April.

Charles S. Chaston
Acting Director

Paris Cable #13729 - 19 April 1945;
London Cable #23149 - 19 April 1945.

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12 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Subject: Further Information Concerning Possible Surrender of German Forces in North Italy.

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, in a report to previous memoranda concerning the efforts of Obergruppenfuhrer and General der Waffen SS, Karl Wolff, the Higher SS and Police Leader in North Italy, to arrange the surrender of German forces in North Italy:

One of Wolff's emissaries, Zimmer, arrived at Lugano on 18 April with a three-page letter from Wolff to the OSS representative written in Wolff's own handwriting and dated 15 April. In this letter Wolff expressed his regrets at President Roosevelt's death and assured the OSS representatives that, no matter what may happen, the OSS representative may count upon him since he (Wolff) is convinced of the logic of the ideas he has already advanced. These ideas he summarized as (1) his conviction that the victorious Allies, by accepting the "honorable" proposals he has already made, should be able to shorten the war and obviate the necessity to destroy "Hitler's Germany"; (2) that he is firmly determined to do everything within his power to realize these objectives, which are not only in the interest of the Allies but, pre-eminently, in the best interest of Germany; and (3) that in spite of difficulties which have delayed the achievement of results, he is convinced of the success of a joint effort.

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Wolff reported that he arrived at Wolff's headquarters in France on 11 April (from his last trip to Switzerland) and left immediately with Wolff to visit Generaloberst Heinrich von Vietinghoff, Commander of the German Forces in North Italy. Von Vietinghoff received them cordially, stating that he had been informed by the Ligurian Corps at Genoa that a British official, whose name he did not know but whom he understood to be an officer, had made contact with a Ligurian Corps staff officer named Vogel, and had asked Vogel to be presented to von Vietinghoff to discuss surrender. Von Vietinghoff said that the Englishman referred to the fact that negotiations had already been started between von Vietinghoff and the GND representative in Bern and gave the current name of the GND representative.

Von Vietinghoff told Wolff that he did not see the Englishman. Believing he had been betrayed, von Vietinghoff prepared a letter to Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff of the GKW, stating that Wolff was in contact with the Allies and that Allies wished to press negotiations. Von Vietinghoff added, however, that he did not want to enter into negotiations until he had received Jodl's approval.

Von Vietinghoff suggested to Wolff that he carry the letter to Jodl, but was persuaded by Wolff, Generalleutnant Reuter (Chief of staff to von Vietinghoff), and Rudolph Rahn (the German Ambassador to the Mussolini regime) not to send the letter at all.

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On the night of 13 April, Himmler telephoned Wolff and ordered him to leave at once for Berlin by the fastest possible means. Wolff did not do so, but instead sent a letter by special courier in which he reminded Himmler (1) that at their last meeting he had told Himmler that since an Allied invasion of Germany would be completely unsuccessful, it was futile to continue to sacrifice the German people, and (2) that Himmler had then insisted that the West Wall would hold. Since he (Wolff) had had been proved right, the letter continued, no purpose could be served by his seeing Himmler. Instead he advised Himmler to come to see him and to arrange for the surrender of all of Germany through the Allied contact which he (Wolff) had already established. Wolff further stated in his letter to Himmler that if Himmler were not prepared to follow this suggestion, he (Wolff) would disassociate himself completely from Himmler.

Himmler telephoned both the morning and afternoon of 14 April to ask why Wolff had not arrived. In each case one of Wolff's aides took the call and reported that Wolff was not at his headquarters but had sent a message via special courier to Himmler.

(Himmler also reported that Wolff had seen Franz Kaser, the Gauleiter of Tyrol, Vorarlberg, Salzburg, Tyrol, Trentino and Dolomites. Kaser, who left Hitler's headquarters on 12 April after talks with

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Wolff, Himmler and Klenner, reported that Hitler and Himmler were then planning to stay in Berlin and, instead of discussing retirement to a "retreat", were talking "seriously" about a new offensive. Klenner also reported that Gauleiter Fahren and Wolff, Wolff's immediate subordinate in the command of the SS in Italy, have been informed of Wolff's plans and negotiations and have promised him their full support.)

Wolff's letter reached Himmler on the evening of 16 April. Later that night Himmler called Wolff several times and Wolff finally decided to leave by plane for Berlin to see Himmler.

Before he left, Wolff sent a message to the OSS representative, explaining that he was going to Berlin because he thought he had an opportunity to do something for the German people, and that he expected to return to his headquarters at Fano on 17 April. Wolff also instructed his emissary Klenner to remain at the Chinese frontier to await developments.

(The OSS representative comments that Himmler apparently plans either to eliminate Wolff or to use Wolff to establish contact for himself with the Allies. The OSS representative believes that there is still a chance that Wolff, if he is not eliminated by Himmler, could be used to effect a general capitulation or one for the Italian theater only.)

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On 10 April the GHI representative obtained the following information regarding the Italian theater from subordinates of Wolff:

von Vlottinghoff's headquarters are located at Recco, 20 miles north-west of Genoa in the foothills of the Alps. The GHI, during the past ten days transferred the area east of the Isenno River from von Vlottinghoff's and Wolff's command to that of Generaloberst Alexander Locher (Lw), Commander of Army Group "F". However, General Erich Ritter von Fohl (Lw), Commander of the German Air Force in Italy, has moved all of his Luftwaffe personnel west of the Isenno River and has strengthened flank installations in the Brenner Pass in order to block any attempt by Locher's forces to enter Italy from the east. Wolff and his associates believe that a move by Locher's forces against von Vlottinghoff's Isenno flank represents the chief threat to the surrender plan.

DET 5721

According to latest news Wolff reached Munich on 10 April, but his arrival in Berlin has not yet been confirmed.

Charles S. Chaston
Acting Director

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

26 April 1945


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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC SERVICES:

Subject: Arrangements pertaining to
German Emisseries.

The enclosed copy of a telegram which the
Combined Chiefs of Staff have this date dispatched to
the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, is
furnished for your information and guidance.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:


A. J. McFARLAND,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Secretary.

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COPY

You are quite free to instruct OAS to inform Furrilli that arrangements will be made for CRITIC and Von Schweinitz to proceed at once to AFHQ.

You should make it absolutely clear to OAS that there must be no bargaining or negotiating whatever in Switzerland. CRITIC and Von Schweinitz must either proceed forthwith to AFHQ or else all contact must be discontinued.

You should inform the Soviet General Staff through the Military Missions in Moscow of this renewed approach emphasizing that it has been made on German initiative and that if the Germans will not proceed at once to AFHQ contact will immediately be broken off. You should ask for a Russian representative to be designated at once to attend negotiations at AFHQ if these materialize.

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15 April 1943

Brig. Gen. A. J. McFarland
 Secretary
 The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Dear General McFarland:

Herewith are two copies, for your immediate use, of cables #9389 and #9389 from the OSS representative in Bern. These cables will be prepared in a formal memorandum for your record.

Sincerely yours,

Charles S. Cheston
 Acting Director

Enclosures.

copy # 6 - 0/9389
 " " 5 - 0/9389

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25 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF

I attach copy of memorandum of today to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This contains the cable of which I spoke to you in our telephone conversation this morning. You will recall that I mentioned that the British were involved. However, a careful re-check of the cable before releasing it revealed that the word British did not fit the context. A review of the work sheets showed that the word "British" was a corruption of one of the code words used to designate one of the important parties in this matter. Accordingly, the corrected cable contains no reference to the British.

Charles S. Chaston
Acting Director

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25 April 1945

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION
FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:SUBJECT: Negotiations Pertaining to the
Surrender of German Armed Forces.

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern on 24 April, was given Swiss Intelligence officers by Obergruppenfuhrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff on 23 April. It summarizes Wolff's reported movements following his return from Berlin and up to his arrival in Switzerland as reported in the OSS representative's cable of 23 April quoted in OSS memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated 25 April 1945.

Wolff reports that he returned to his Fasano headquarters about noon on 19 April. On 21 April, Wolff called on Generaloberst von Vietinghoff, Commander of the German forces in Italy, and on Franz Hofer, Gauleiter of Tirol, to make certain that they could support any action he might take.

Wolff reports that on the evening of 22 April, after a talk with Parrilli, he decided to go to Switzerland with an authorized representative of von Vietinghoff. During the night written power for Lieutenant-Colonel Victor von Scheinits was obtained from von Vietinghoff. On 23 April, Wolff and his adjutant, Vanner, and Scheinits crossed the border into Switzerland.

The OSS representative also reports that Swiss Intelligence officers have obtained from Wolff the following sketchy account of Wolff's trip to Berlin:

Wolff declares that on the first day of his visit to Berlin, 16 April, he first saw Himmler alone and then Himmler and Kaltenbrunner together. Both meetings, he says, lasted many hours. Kaltenbrunner appeared well-informed with respect to Wolff's two visits to Switzerland and attacked Wolff furiously for making them.

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(Haff also told the Director of his "firm conviction that someone in the inner circle" of his group is passing on to Kaltenbrunner information regarding the group's efforts to negotiate with the Allies and that Kaltenbrunner's accurate knowledge of details of the negotiations cannot otherwise be explained.)

According to Haff, Himmler mentioned three possibilities as to his own and Hitler's future: (1) to fight it out at Berlin; (2) to retreat to the "northern redoubt", or (3) to retreat by plane to Berchtesgaden. With respect to (3), Haff also added that Hitler no longer liked to fly, but might do so in an emergency.

On the second day of his visit, 19 April, Haff says that he had a meeting with Hitler in a bunker about two hours' ride from the center of Berlin. Hitler, he declares, appeared low in spirits but not without hope, and stated in effect: "We must fight on to gain time. In two more months the break between the Anglo-Saxons and the Russians will materialize; then I shall join whichever party approaches me first." Haff says that he tried to put in a word about the senselessness of further destruction in Italy, but that Hitler did not react.

Charles B. Cheston
Acting Director

Bern Cable #9119 (IN 11276) - 24 April 1945.

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Handwritten signature
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24 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

SUBJECT: Negotiations Pertaining to the Surrender of German Armed Forces.

- REFERENCE:** (a) OSS Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 24 April 1945.
 (b) JCS Memorandum for the Director of Strategic Services (SS-1138), 20 April 1945.

The following is supplementary to reference memorandum (a):

On the evening of 23 April the office of Major General John E. Hall, MGSS, OPD, requested and received the latest information on this subject. The three cables quoted in reference memorandum (a), and the following cable sent to the OSS representative in Bern on 20 April upon receipt of reference memorandum (b), were delivered to him:

"1. By letter today JCS directs that OSS break off all contact with German emissaries at once. You are therefore instructed to discontinue immediately all such contacts.

"2. Letter also states OSS have approved message to German emissary that it is clear to them from HAF GIB that German emissary does not intend to surrender his forces at this time on acceptable terms. Message continues:

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Accordingly, especially in view of complications which have arisen with Gurnea, the US and British Governments have decided that GSI should break off contacts; that JCI are so instructing GSI; that whole matter is to be regarded as closed and that Gurnea be informed through Archer and Deane."

On 21 April the GSI representative was further instructed by cable as follows (General Hull did not receive a copy of this dispatch):

"Will you advise that orders to terminate GSI contacts have been carried out by you? Also please advise when you have succeeded in breaking off all contacts, so we may tell JCI orders have been carried out."

Subsequent to the receipt of information contained in reference memorandum (a), the GSI representative in Bern, on 23 April, cabled as follows:

"1. Weibel, a Swiss intelligence officer, telephoned from Geneva that Wolff and his party have left for Lucerne. Weibel believes that von Vietinghoff's representative has a serious and important mission and powers.

"2. I told Weibel that pending further instructions to the contrary I would not see Wolff or von Vietinghoff's representative but that if he (Weibel) had information to communicate to me, I would receive it."

A later cable, dispatched on the night of 23 April, is as follows:

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"1. Wolff, Lieutenant-Colonel Victor von Schweinitz (previously referred to as Colonel Schweinitz), and Vanner (Wolff's adjutant), were at Weibel's house in Lucerne.

"2. Tonight, 23 April, I advised Parrilli (son of Wolff's commanding officer) in the presence of Weibel and Hermann (German intelligence officer) that on the basis of information I had received the matter was no longer of interest to the Allies and that I was taking this first opportunity I had had to communicate this fact to him.

"3. Parrilli (whose statements were supported by Weibel and Hermann) stated (1) that Wolff and Schweinitz were prepared to proceed to Allied headquarters in southern Italy to conclude matters; (2) that when they started out they believed that this was one of two alternative procedures for surrender which had been suggested to them; (3) that the other alternative (to pass through Allied lines) had been discarded as likely to lead to premature disclosure or accident, especially with the present unsettled condition of the front. Weibel stated that Schweinitz had impressed him as a capable staff officer who, I understand, had been on Kesselring's staff in Italy.

"4. The German text of Schweinitz's powers is an official stationery and reads: 'Der Oberbefehlshaber Südwest und Oberbefehlshaber der Heeresgruppe C Hq., den 22 April 1945. Der Oberstleutnant i. G. von Schweinitz ist von mir bevollmächtigt Verhandlungen zu führen und im Rahmen der ihm von mir erteilten Weisungen für sich bindende Aussagen zu machen. von Vietinghoff.' The Supreme Commander Southwest and Supreme Commander of Army Group G, Headquarters, 22 April 1945. Lieutenant-Colonel von Schweinitz, GSC, is empowered by me to undertake negotiations and, within the limits of the instructions I have given him, to conclude agreements which will be binding on me. von Vietinghoff. Wolff clearly has full powers as to all and other troops under his command.

"5. It is difficult to see clearly in this complicated matter and I only ventured to listen to their story after advising them of the decision in paragraph 2, because

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that decision was apparently predicated upon evidence then available that the Germans had no intention of surrendering under terms acceptable to us. I can give no guarantee that they are now prepared to do so, but if in fact Wolff and Gruenthal are ready to go to southern Italy to work out unconditional surrender, this could not fail seriously to undermine German morale in Italy, even if immediate surrender is not effected. Naturally, lacking their direct assurance, I cannot guarantee that they will go, but Weibel's statement impresses me that they will do so. One must not overlook the possibility that, in view of the approaching crisis in North Italy, Wolff may wish to substitute Vanner as his representative with full powers.

"6. I await instructions. If negative, kindly advise so that I may merely confirm that break is final and that there is no interest in having the above emissaries go south."

On 24 April, upon receipt of the above cable, I communicated with General Hull, who asked to have a copy of the message immediately for discussion with the Chief of Staff. Accordingly a copy of this message was delivered to General Hull and he was informed that instructions would be forthcoming.

Charles G. Weston
Acting Director

Mem Subject:

15519 (OUT 9185) - 4/21/45
15519 (OUT 9185) - 4/21/45
15519 (IN 11110) - 4/22/45
15519 (IN 11110) - 4/22/45

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24 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

SUBJECT: Negotiations Pertaining to the Surrender of German Armed Forces.

REFERENCE: JCS Memorandum for the Director of Strategic Services (M-1138), 20 April 1945.

The following has been received by radio, dated 23 April 1945, from the OSS representative in Bern:

"1. As previously reported, I received and am complying with JCS and OSS instructions. I pointed out, however, that no contact existed at present and that Parrilli [one of Wolff's emissaries] was on my way.

"2. I am now informed (but have not yet directly confirmed) that Parrilli arrived early this morning with news that Wolff and Roettiger, von Vietinghoff's chief of staff, were arriving at frontier about 1300 hours our time with papers. They contemplate proceeding Lucerne. I had no means of stopping this arrival or of communicating information that matter was being dropped.

"3. Swiss intelligence for their own purposes will probably desire to retain contact with Parrilli et al., but over this I have no control and it is solely their concern.

"4. Pending your instructions, I shall decline see Wolff or Roettiger, assuming they arrive safely, but will receive and communicate to you, as intelligence, any information they may pass via our Swiss intermediaries."

A later cable dated 23 April has been received, as follows:

...that he accompanied by Colonel ...
...may be garbled), with full powers ...
...in 111.

Mr. Merrill states Sullivan being sent to Moscow to ...
...and to endeavor arrange for him to take some action."

Upon receipt of the foregoing, the following supplementary information was cabled to our Bern representative:

"Action suggested in paragraph 4 your #9209 might be construed as continuation of SUNNIT negotiations and should not be pursued. To assume your reference to Swiss intermediaries relates to the past and not to any continuing relationship on this question, but it is important that you confirm this assumption. If, however, as stated in paragraph 3, the Swiss are acting completely on their own and not as your intermediaries, any approaches by SUNNIT personnel to Swiss is a Swiss affair. Information coming to you from Swiss, acting wholly in their own interests, and without instigation by you, direct or indirect, should properly be transmitted."

Charles E. ...
Acting Director

Bern Cables:

#9209 (IN 11048) - 4/22/45
#9209 (IN 11083) - 4/23/45
#9209 (IN 11102) - 4/23/45
#9209 (OUT 9221) - 4/23/45

may be better. The full text of the document is not available.

...arrangements for him to take command of...

As a result of the foregoing, the following supplementary information was obtained to our firm representative:

"Action suggested in paragraph 4 your 49204 might be counterproductive in continuation of SWISS negotiations and should not be pursued. To assume your reference to Swiss intermediaries relates to the past and not to any continuing relationship on this question, but it is important that you confirm this assumption. If, however, as stated in paragraph 3, the Swiss are acting completely on their own and not as your intermediaries, any approach by SWISS personalities to Swiss is a Swiss affair. Information coming to you from Swiss, acting wholly in their own interests, and without instigation by you, direct or indirect, should properly be transmitted."

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

TOP SECRET

20 APR 11 1943

Miss Rose Conway
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Miss Conway:

I think the attached memo-
reaches will be of interest to the
President. Will you please see that it
reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Charles J. Chastan
Acting Director

Attachment

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

10 APR 11 1943

Wm. H. Connery
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Wm. Connery:

I think the attached memorandum will be of interest to the President. Will you please see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Charles E. Chonten
Acting Director

Attachment

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

20 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have today directed that all contact with the German emissaries mentioned in my memorandum to you of 18 April 1945 be terminated.

This action came about as the result of dispatch by the Combined Chiefs of Staff of a message to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, stating that in view of (1) their belief that the German Commander in Chief, Italy did not at this time intend to surrender on acceptable terms and (2) complications which had arisen with the Russians on the matter it had been decided by the Governments of the United States and Great Britain that the contact should be broken off.

Orders to this effect were immediately forwarded by this office to the GMB representative in Bern.

Charles E. Chaston
Acting Director

TOP SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SM-1338
20 April 1948

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC SERVICES:

Subject: Negotiations Pertaining to the Surrender of German Armed Forces.

Enclosure: Copy of message sent this date by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved and dispatched the attached message to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire that the Office of Strategic Services break off all contact with the German emissaries at once.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

A. J. McFarland
A. J. McFARLAND,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Secretary.

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1. It is quite clear from NAP 916 that the Commander in Chief, Italy, has no intention of surrendering his forces, anyhow at the present stage, on terms acceptable to ourselves.
2. In the circumstances, and having regard to the complications that have arisen with the Russians over this matter, our two governments have decided that O.S.S. should at once break off contact with the German emissaries. United States Chiefs of Staff are instructing O.S.S. accordingly.
3. You should regard the whole matter as now closed, and so inform the Russians through Deane and Archer.

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16 10 7
19 April 1945

Miss Grace Gandy
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Miss Gandy:

In accordance with our telephone conversation of this afternoon, I hand you herewith certain highly secret material which has been transmitted to us by our representative in Bern.

The Director of Strategic Services has, in the past, had instructions from the late President Roosevelt to forward to him, directly through Miss Grace Tully, his confidential secretary, certain selected secret intelligence material of special importance and interest.

During the past two months, representatives of this organization in Bern, Switzerland have, through appropriate cut-outs, been in conversation with certain highly placed Germans who have sought to arrange for a surrender of German forces in North Italy. We kept President Roosevelt, as well as the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, currently informed concerning developments in this matter.

Attached hereto are memoranda giving a summary of conversations from 8 February to 10 April 1945, together with latest information which has just been received. General Donovan, the Director of Strategic Services, has instructed us from abroad to ask to be permitted to transmit this material to the President for his information.

The nature of the material and the urgency of bringing it to the President's attention require that it go through as few hands as possible. Would you, therefore, be good enough to bring this material to the President's attention.

Sincerely yours,

E. J. Putkell, Jr.
Lieut. (j.g.), USNR
Actg. Executive Officer

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16.157

10 April 1948

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

General Donovan, Director of Strategic Services, has requested by cable that the attached reports be transmitted to you. These reports relate to efforts of General Kurt Wolff, the German Higher SS and Police Leader in North Italy, to arrange for the surrender of German forces in North Italy.

We have kept the Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, AFM, and SHAN currently advised concerning this matter.

Upon his return from the European Theater, General Donovan would welcome an opportunity to supplement these reports and give you certain details which he thought could not appropriately be transmitted by cable.

Charles B. Chaston
Acting Director

Enclosures:

APPENDIX A - Efforts of SS General Wolff to bring about surrender of German forces in North Italy--10 April to 10 April 1948.

APPENDIX B - Efforts of SS General Wolff to bring about surrender of German forces in North Italy--Summary of conversations and communications during period 8 February to 10 April 1948.

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16 167

Efforts of General Wolff to bring about surrender of German forces in North Italy--10 April to 16 April 1945

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Milan, in a sequel to previous memoranda concerning the efforts of Obergruppenfuhrer and General der Waffen SS, Paul Wolff, the Higher SS and Police Leader in North Italy, to arrange the surrender of German forces in North Italy:

One of Wolff's colonelcies, Zimmer, arrived at Lugano on 16 April with a three-page letter from Wolff to the OSS representative written in Wolff's own handwriting and dated 15 April. In this letter Wolff expressed his regrets at President Roosevelt's death and assured the OSS representatives that, no matter what may happen, the OSS representative may count upon him since he (Wolff) is convinced of the logic of the ideas he has already advanced. These ideas he summarized as (1) his conviction that the victorious Allies, by accepting the "honorable" proposals he has already made, should be able to shorten the war and obviate the necessity to destroy "lives and culture"; (2) that he is firmly determined to do everything within his power to realize these objectives, which are not only in the interest of the Allies but, pre-eminently, in the best interest of Germany; and (3) that in spite of difficulties which have delayed the achievement of results, he is convinced of final success of the joint effort.

The accuracy of the essential facts contained in these memoranda is not in doubt in Lugano, S.

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- 2 -

Zimmer reported that he arrived at Wolff's headquarters in Pavia on 11 April (from his last trip to Switzerland) and left immediately with Wolff to visit Generaloberst Heinrich von Viettinghoff, Commander of the German forces in North Italy. Von Viettinghoff received them cordily, stating that he had been informed by the Ligurian Corps at Genoa that a British official, whose name he did not know but whom he understood to be an officer, had made contact with a Ligurian Corps staff officer named Vogel, and had asked Vogel to be presented to von Viettinghoff to discuss surrender. Von Viettinghoff said that the Englishman referred to the fact that negotiations had already been started between von Viettinghoff and the OSS representative in Bern and gave the correct name of the OSS representative.

Von Viettinghoff told Wolff that he did not see the Englishman. Believing he had been betrayed, von Viettinghoff prepared a letter to Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff of the OKW, stating that Wolff was in contact with the Allies and that Allies wished to press negotiations.

Von Viettinghoff added, however, that he did not want to enter into negotiations until he had received Jodl's approval.

Von Viettinghoff suggested to Wolff that he carry the letter to Jodl, but was persuaded by Wolff, Generalleutnant Root-Blum (chief of staff to von Viettinghoff), and Rudolph Rahn (the German Ambassador to the Swiss) not to send the letter at all.

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- 3 -

On the night of 13 April, Himmler telephoned Wolff and ordered him to leave at once for Berlin by the fastest possible means. Wolff did not do so, but instead sent a letter by special courier in which he reminded Himmler (1) that at their last meeting he had told Himmler that since an Allied invasion of Germany would be completely successful, it was futile to continue to sacrifice the German people, and (2) that Himmler had then insisted that the West Wall would hold. Since he (Wolff) now had been proved right, the letter continued, no purpose could be served by his seeing Himmler. Instead he advised Himmler to come to see him and to arrange for the surrender of all of Germany through the Allied contact which he (Wolff) had already established. Wolff further stated in his letter to Himmler that if Himmler were not prepared to follow this suggestion, he (Wolff) would dissociate himself completely from Himmler.

Himmler telephoned both the morning and afternoon of 14 April to ask why Wolff had not arrived. In each case one of Wolff's aides took the call and reported that Wolff was not at his headquarters but had sent a message via special courier to Himmler.

(Himmler also reported that Wolff had seen Franz Hofer, the Gauleiter of Tyrol, Vorarlberg, Salzburg, Belluno, Trentino and Bolzano. Hofer, who left Himmler's headquarters on 12 April after talks with

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Both Hitler and Himmler, reported that Hitler and Himmler were then planning to stay in Berlin and, instead of discussing retirement to a "retreat", were talking "seriously" about a new offensive. Himmler also reported that Gauleiterhofer and Haff, Wolff's immediate subordinate in the command of the SS in Italy, have been informed of Wolff's plans and negotiations and have promised him their full support.)

Wolff's letter reached Himmler on the evening of 16 April. Later that night Himmler called Wolff several times and Wolff finally decided to leave by plane for Berlin to see Himmler.

Before he left, Wolff sent a message to the OSS representative, explaining that he was going to Berlin because he thought he had an opportunity to do something for the German people, and that he expected to return to his headquarters at Fussen on 17 April. Wolff also instructed his emissary Himmler to remain at the Chiasso frontier to await developments.

(The OSS representative comments that Himmler apparently plans either to eliminate Wolff or to use Wolff to establish contact for himself with the Allies. The OSS representative believes that there is still a chance that Wolff, if he is not eliminated by Himmler, could be used to effect a general capitulation or one for the Italian theater only.)

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On 11 April the GIB representative obtained the following information regarding the Italian theater from subordinates of Wolff:

von Vietinghoff's headquarters are located at Alessandria, 100 miles northwest of Verona in the foothills of the Alps. The GIB, Germany within the past ten days transferred the area east of the Isarco River from von Vietinghoff's and Wolff's command to that of Generaloberst Alexander Locher (Lt), Commander of Army Group "F". However, General Erich Ritter von Pohl (Lt), Commander of the German Air Force in Italy, has moved all of his Luftwaffe personnel west of the Isarco River and has strengthened flank installations in the Brenner Pass in order to block any attempt by Locher's forces to enter Italy from the east. Wolff and his associates believe that a move by Locher's forces against von Vietinghoff's Isarco flank represents the chief threat to the surrender plan.

• • • • •

According to latest news Wolff reached Munich on 14 April, but his arrival in Berlin has not yet been confirmed.

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APPENDIX B to 10 April
1945 : as to President

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Summary of General Wolff to being about surrender of German
forces in North Italy--Summary of conversations and communica-
tions during period 8 February to 10 April 1945

The following is a summary of negotiations with a view
to surrender by German forces in North Italy covering conversa-
tions and communications during the period 8 February -- 10 April,
as reported by the OSS representatives in Bari and Caserta.

The principal German negotiator has been Obergruppen-
führer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff, Higher SS and
Police Leader in Italy and chief of Hitler's personal staff.

A preliminary contact, made with the OSS representative
in Bari on 8 February, indicated that Field Marshal Albert Kessel-
ring, then Commander of the German forces in Italy; Rudolph Hahn,
German Ambassador to the Mussolini regime in North Italy; and
Wolff were disposed to negotiate with the Allies with a view to
ending German resistance in North Italy. On 8 March Wolff arrived
in Lugano, asserting that he intended to make definite commitments
for leading Germany out of the war. He proposed, with Kesselring's
support, to terminate hostilities in Italy and to appeal to German

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- 11 -

Army command on the Western Front to follow their example. Wolff intended to Italy to confer with Kesselring while arrangements were being made by AFHQ for a meeting with emissaries from Wolff and Kesselring.

Although Kesselring was recalled to Hitler's Headquarters before Wolff was able to see him and subsequently was assigned to the command of the Western Front, Wolff returned to a meeting with Allied (AFHQ) representatives at a place near Legnano on 18 March. He expressed sincerely determined to attempt to effect an immediate German surrender, stressing particularly that it would surely mean massive destruction and slaughter of the German people if Hitler were able to carry out the plan of resistance in the German "homeland." Wolff declared that he would not alone if necessary, but hoped to have time to win over the new Commander of German Forces in Italy, Generaloberst Heinrich von Vietinghoff.

On 19 March Wolff informed the AFHQ representative in Rome that while he had not been able to see Vietinghoff, he had visited Kesselring, who advised him to go through with the plan for surrender in Italy. However, Kesselring said he could not accompany on the Western Front because he was surrounded by circumstances which he could not trust.

On 3 April Wolff reported that he could not return to Switzerland because Hitler had previously ordered him by telephone on 1 April not to leave North Italy. However, Wolff stated that both von Vietinghoff and his Chief of Staff,

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Generaloberst Heutiger, agreed that it was "necessary to
be on fighting." Wolff instructed his emissary to tell Allied
representatives that, given ten more days, he and Vietinghoff
would be able to hand over North Italy.

As a result of long conferences held on 5 and 7 April,
Wolff, von Vietinghoff, and Heutiger sent an emissary to ask for
the text of the Allied surrender formula. The principle of un-
conditional surrender was not questioned provided certain stipu-
lations were accepted regarding "military honor" and the dis-
position of the German forces to be surrendered. The three German
leaders proposed a point on the front lines through which Allied
representatives might pass safely in order to conclude the surrender.

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13 April 1945

Colonel Suxton:

Attached for your signature
is a memorandum addressed to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, based on Bern cable
#8699, of 13 April, reporting the lo-
cation of Field Marshal Keesselring's
new headquarters.

For General Magruder

C. T., Jr.

per Lt

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS -- Intelligence Service

14618

16, 107
C. G. G. G. G. G.
TOP SECRET

13 April 1945

D. 107 687

**MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION
FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:****SUBJECT: Kesselring's New Headquarters.**

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, has been obtained from an emissary of Obergruppenfuhrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff:

The new headquarters of Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, commander of German forces in the west, are located at Weiden, 50 miles east of Nuremberg and some ten miles west of the pre-1939 Czechoslovak frontier.

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

Dist. Cable (RM) - 13 April 1945.

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10 April 1945

Colonel Buxton:

Attached for your signature are memoranda addressed to the President, the Secretary of State, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These memoranda are based on Bern cable #8499, of 9 April, concerning the possible surrender of German forces in North Italy.

For General Magruder

C. T., Jr.

per Lt

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS -- Intelligence Service

16, 107

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20 April 1945

Also Given Tully The White House

Dear Mr. Kelly:

The attached memorandum, sequel to previous memoranda concerning the possible surrender of German forces in North Italy, will probably be of interest to the President.

Sincerely yours,

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

Discussion

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10 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Rome, is a sequel to previous memoranda concerning the possible surrender of German forces in North Italy. It is a summary of a more comprehensive report which has been communicated to AWHQ.

Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff, the Higher SS and Police Leader in Italy; Generaloberst Heinrich von Vietinghoff, Commander of the German forces in Italy; and Generalleutnant Roettiger, von Vietinghoff's Chief of Staff, have requested the text of the Allied surrender formula, but have made certain stipulations regarding "military honor" and the disposition of forces to be surrendered.

Wolff reports, through his emissary, that he held long conferences with von Vietinghoff and Roettiger on 5 and 7 April at which the principle of unconditional surrender was not questioned provided such surrender be "honorable". All three recognize that since the German armies in Italy soon will be isolated, von Vietinghoff is justified in acting on his own initia-

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live. Heiff recognizes the futility of further fighting, but reports that von Vietinghoff, an old-line soldier, insists that the surrender be "dressed up" so as to be compatible with his "military honor" and to avoid placing him in the position of a traitor.

Subject to solving this "military honor" problem, the three men have proposed a point on the front lines through which Allied representatives may pass safely to conclude the surrender, and they have promised again to do everything possible to prevent destruction, to limit warfare against Italian partisans, and to protect prisoners and hostages. They state, however, that Admiral Iacono has ordered marine destruction and they doubt whether they can effectively prevent this.

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

Rern Cable #2499 - 9 April 1945.

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10 April 1945

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Honorable James C. Dunn
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State

Dear Mr. Dunn:

The Secretary will probably be interested in the enclosed memorandum, which is a sequel to previous memoranda dealing with the possible surrender of German forces in North Italy.

Sincerely yours,

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

Enclosure.

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TOP SECRET**10 April 1945****MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:**

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, in a sequel to previous memoranda concerning the possible surrender of German forces in North Italy. It is a summary of a more comprehensive report which has been communicated to AFHQ.

Sturmgroßgruppenführer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff, the Higher SS and Police Leader in Italy; Generalleutnant Heinrich von Vietinghoff, Commander of the German forces in Italy; and Generalleutnant Roettiger, von Vietinghoff's Chief of Staff, have requested the text of the Allied surrender formula, but have made certain stipulations regarding "military honor" and the disposition of forces to be surrendered.

Wolff reports, through his emissary, that he held long conferences with von Vietinghoff and Roettiger on 5 and 7 April at which the principle of unconditional surrender was not questioned provided such surrender be "honorable". All three recognize that since the German armies in Italy soon will be isolated, von Vietinghoff is justified in acting on his own initiative. Wolff

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recognizes the desirability of further fighting, but reports that von Tistinghoff, an old-line soldier, insists that the surrender be "dressed up" so as to be compatible with his "military honor" and to avoid placing him in the position of a traitor.

Subject to solving this "military honor" problem, the three men have proposed a point on the front lines through which Allied representatives may pass safely to conclude the surrender, and they have promised again to do everything possible to prevent destruction, to limit warfare against Italian partisans, and to protect prisoners and hostages. They state, however, that Admiral Donato has ordered marine destruction, and they doubt whether they can effectively prevent this.

G. Edward Dunton
Acting Director

Bern Cable #0459 - 9 April 1945.

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10 April 1945

DOTS 683

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION
FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:**SUBJECT: Further Negotiations for Surrender
of German Forces in North Italy.**

The following information, transmitted by the OSB representative in Rome, is a sequel to previous memoranda concerning the possible surrender of German forces in North Italy. It is a summary of a more comprehensive report which has been communicated to AFHQ.

~~Obergruppenfuhrer~~ and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff, the Higher SS and Police Leader in Italy; Generaloberst Heinrich von Vietinghoff, Commander of the German forces in Italy; and Generalleutnant Roettiger, von Vietinghoff's Chief of Staff, have requested the text of the Allied surrender formula, but have made certain stipulations regarding "military honor" and the disposition of forces to be surrendered.

Wolff reports, through his emissary, that he held long conferences with von Vietinghoff and Roettiger on 5 and 7 April at which the principle of unconditional surrender was not questioned provided such surrender be "honorable". All three recognize that since the German armies in Italy soon will be isolated, von Vietinghoff is justified in acting on his own initiative. Wolff recognizes the futility of further fighting, but reports that von Vietinghoff, an old-line soldier, insists that the surrender be

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crossed up" so as to be compatible with his "military honor" and to avoid placing him in the position of a traitor.

Subject to solving this "military honor" problem, the three men have proposed a point on the front lines through which Allied representatives may pass safely to conclude the surrender, and they have promised again to do everything possible to prevent destruction, to limit warfare against Italian partisans, and to protect prisoners and hostages. They state, however, that Admiral Donitz has ordered marine destruction and they doubt whether they can effectively prevent this.

G. Edward Suxton
Acting Director

Bern Cable #8499 - 9 April 1945.

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4 April 1945

**TERMINATION OF INFORMATION
FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:****SUBJECT: Further German Proposals for Termination
of Hostilities in Italy.**

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, is a sequel to previous memoranda concerning the possible surrender of German forces in North Italy:

An Italian emissary, Parrilli, arrived in Switzerland on 3 April with the following report from Obergruppenführer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff, who is currently at his headquarters in Füssen:

Himmler has returned to his German headquarters from his urgent trip to Hungary, and on 1 April peremptorily ordered Wolff by telephone under no conditions to leave North Italy. Himmler told Wolff that he would telephone him periodically. Himmler chided Wolff for having moved his family to the vicinity of Brenner, and declared that he had moved Wolff's family at once back to St. Wolfgang, near Salzburg, and could take "better care" of it.

Wolff is convinced that if he were now to make a false move or to leave his headquarters for Switzerland, his whole project for a surrender in North Italy would fall and he would be liquidated. He believes that Himmler has given spec-

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not instructions that he be watched. Accordingly, he feels it is impossible for him to come to Switzerland now.

Wolff has discussed the whole surrender plan with Benito Mussolini, the German Ambassador to the Mussolini regime in North Italy, and declares that Mussolini is in full agreement. On the night of 1 April he conferred with Generaloberst Heinrich von Viettinghoff, Kesselring's successor as commander of the German forces in North Italy, and Generalleutnant Roettiger, von Viettinghoff's Chief of Staff. Wolff claims that both agreed with him, and quotes von Viettinghoff as saying that "it is nonsense to go on fighting." Wolff declares that von Viettinghoff has been instructed, in the event of a general Allied attack, to carry out a "fighting" and scorched-earth withdrawal to the Alps. Wolff reported fully to von Viettinghoff on his recent conference with Kesselring, and told him that in Kesselring's judgment the fighting on the Western Front might last ten or fifteen days longer, and that Germany is facing catastrophe.

Wolff instructed Parrilli to tell Allied representatives that, given ten more days, he and von Viettinghoff and Mussolini would be able to hand over North Italy.

Parrilli has returned to Wolff's headquarters with a message from Allied representatives acknowledging receipt of information that Mussolini and von Viettinghoff have been won over to the plan, but stating that if there is to be a military surrender, it must be effected quickly. With the approval of AFHQ representatives, the GCH representative also asked Parrilli to

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replied Wolff (1) that it is vital that he and von Vietinghoff prevent the destruction of North Italy as ordered by Hitler and Hider; (2) that he (Wolff) had previously promised to restrain action against Italian partisans and to protect Allied and partisan prisoners and hostages in his hands; (3) that he (Wolff) and his associates now have a last opportunity for action and that action alone counts, and (4) that further delay would not help but might even complicate the picture, since from the "redoubt" Hitler may exercise an increasingly terroristic influence.

(The OSS representative comments that Wolff and his associates probably want to wait in the hope that complete chaos will develop in Germany, enabling them to act in Italy without serious risk to themselves and their families. The threat to Wolff may be real. In view of the time which has elapsed since the original approach from Wolff, the number of meetings which have been held relating to the surrender proposal, and the number of persons who have been brought into the picture, some inkling of the plot has probably reached Hitler's ears. The OSS representative cannot predict what action Wolff and von Vietinghoff will now take, but declares that everything possible has been done to impress the Wolff group with the realities of the situation and the need to act at once.)

William J. Donovan
Director

Worm Cable #4029 - 4/5/45 (SECRET)

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TOP SECRET

16, 10 7

4 April 1945

**Miss Grace Tully
The White House**

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested in the enclosed message from our representative in Bern. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk?
Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

**William J. Donovan
Director**

Enclosure.

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TOP SECRET**4 April 1945****MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:**

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, is a sequel to previous memoranda concerning the possible surrender of German forces in North Italy:

An Italian emissary, Ferrilli, arrived in Switzerland on 3 April with the following report from Obergruppenführer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff, who is currently at his headquarters in Passau:

Hitler has returned to his German headquarters from his recent trip to Hungary, and on 1 April peremptorily ordered Wolff by telephone under no conditions to leave North Italy. Hitler told Wolff that he would telephone him periodically. Hitler rebuked Wolff for having moved his family to the vicinity of Bremer, and declared that he had moved Wolff's family at once back to St. Wolfgang, near Salzburg, and could take "better care" of it.

Wolff is convinced that if he were now to make a false move or to leave his headquarters for Switzerland, his

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whole project for a surrender in North Italy would fail and he would be liquidated. He believes that Himmler has given special instructions that he be watched. Accordingly, he feels it is imperative for him to come to Switzerland now.

Wolff has discussed the whole surrender plan with Heinrich Himmler, the German Commander to the Mussolini regime in North Italy, and declares that Himmler is in full agreement. On the night of 1 April he conferred with Generaloberst Heinrich von Vietinghoff, Kesselring's successor as commander of the German forces in North Italy, and Generalleutnant Heettiger, von Vietinghoff's Chief of Staff. Wolff claims that both agreed with him, and quotes von Vietinghoff as saying that "it is nonsense to go on fighting." Wolff declares that von Vietinghoff has been instructed, in the event of a general Allied attack, to carry out a "fighting" and scorched-earth withdrawal to the Alps. Wolff reported fully to von Vietinghoff on his recent conference with Kesselring, and told him that in Kesselring's judgment the fighting on the Western Front might last ten or fifteen days longer, and that Germany is facing catastrophe.

Wolff instructed Pavilli to tell Allied representatives that, given ten more days, he and von Vietinghoff and Himmler would be able to hand over North Italy.

Pavilli has returned to Wolff's headquarters with

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a message from Allied representatives acknowledging receipt of information that Rein and von Vlottinghoff have been won over to the plan, but stating that if there is to be a military surrender, it must be effected quickly. With the approval of AFM representatives, the OSS representative also asked Pavilli to remind Wolff (1) that it is vital that he and von Vlottinghoff prevent the destruction of North Italy as ordered by Himmler and Hitler; (2) that he (Wolff) had previously promised to restrain action against Italian partisans and to protect Allied and partisan prisoners and hostages in his hands; (3) that he (Wolff) and his associates now have a last opportunity for action and that action alone counts, and (4) that further delay would not help but might even complicate the picture, since from the "redoubt" Himmler may exercise an increasingly terroristic influence.

(The OSS representative comments that Wolff and his associates probably want to wait in the hope that complete chaos will develop in Germany, enabling them to act in Italy without serious risk to themselves and their families. The threat to Wolff may be real. In view of the time which has elapsed since the original approach from Wolff, the number of meetings which have been held relating to the surrender

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proposal, and the number of persons who have been brought into the picture, even talking of the plot has probably reached Himmler's ears. The OSS representative cannot predict what action Wolff and von Vietinghoff will now take, but declares that everything possible has been done to impress the Wolff group with the realities of the situation and the need to act at once.)

William J. Donovan
Director

Bern Cable #0029 - 4/3/45 (SUBRIS)

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

4 April 1945

Donovan

Honorable James C. Dunn
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State

Dear Jimmy:

The enclosed report from our Barn representative will probably be of interest to the Secretary. I will appreciate your seeing that it reaches him.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET**4 April 1945****MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:**

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, is a sequel to previous memoranda concerning the possible surrender of German forces in North Italy:

An Italian emissary, Favilli, arrived in Switzerland on 3 April with the following report from Obergruppenfuhrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff, who is currently at his headquarters in Basle:

Himmler has returned to his German headquarters from his urgent trip to Hungary, and on 1 April peremptorily ordered Wolff by telephone under no conditions to leave North Italy. Himmler told Wolff that he would telephone him periodically. Himmler chided Wolff for having moved his family to the vicinity of Brenner, and declared that he had moved Wolff's family at once back to St. Wolfgang, near Salzburg, and could take "better care" of it.

Wolff is convinced that if he were now to make a false move up to leave his headquarters for Switzerland, his whole project for a surrender in North Italy would fail and he would be liquidated. He believes that Himmler has given special instructions that he be watched. Accordingly, he feels it is impossible for him to come to Switzerland now.

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- 2 -

Wolff has discussed the whole surrender plan with Rudolph Rahn, the German Ambassador to the Mussolini regime in North Italy, and declares that Rahn is in full agreement. On the night of 1 April he conferred with Generaleoberst Heinrich von Vietinghoff, Kesselring's successor as commander of the German forces in North Italy, and Generalleutnant Keottiger, von Vietinghoff's Chief of Staff. Wolff claims that both agreed with him, and quotes von Vietinghoff as saying that "it is nonsense to go on fighting." Wolff declares that von Vietinghoff has been instructed, in the event of a general Allied attack, to carry out a "fighting" and scorched-earth withdrawal to the Alps. Wolff reported fully to von Vietinghoff on his recent conference with Kesselring, and told him that in Kesselring's judgment the fighting on the Western Front might last ten or fifteen days longer, and that Germany is facing catastrophe.

Wolff instructed Parrilli to tell Allied representatives that, given ten more days, he and von Vietinghoff and Rahn would be able to hand over North Italy.

Parrilli has returned to Wolff's headquarters with a message from Allied representatives acknowledging receipt of information that Rahn and von Vietinghoff have been won over to the plan, but stating that if there is to be a military surrender, it must be effected quickly. With the approval of AFHQ representatives, the

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the representative also stated that Wolff (1) that it is vital that he and von Vittinghoff prevent the destruction of North Italy as ordered by Himmler and Hitler; (2) that he (Wolff) had previously promised to restrain action against Italian partisans and to protect Allied and partisan prisoners and hostages in his hands; (3) that he (Wolff) and his associates now have a last opportunity for action and that action alone counts, and (4) that further delay would not help but might even complicate the picture, since from the "redoubt" Himmler may exercise an increasingly totalitarian influence.

(The OSS representative comments that Wolff and his associates probably want to wait in the hope that complete chaos will develop in Germany, enabling them to act in Italy without serious risk to themselves and their families. The threat to Wolff may be real. In view of the time which has elapsed since the original approach from Wolff, the number of meetings which have been held relating to the surrender proposal, and the number of persons who have been brought into the picture, some inkling of the plot has probably reached Himmler's ears. The OSS representative cannot predict what action Wolff and von Vittinghoff will now take, but declares that everything possible has been done to impress the Wolff group with the realities of the situation and the need to act at once.)

Reun cable (INFO) - 4/2/45 (MMH:US)

William J. Donovan
Director

TOP SECRET

0 4/2

Delivered by
Amshunlov
EJP

TOP SECRET

16 197
1 April 1945

1. In good & true

W. J. Donovan

Mr. Charles Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear General:

I think the attached memorandum
will be of interest to the President. Will
you please see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Attachment

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

1 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following triple priority dispatch has just been received from the OSS representative in Bern relating to the most recent developments in connection with the possible surrender of German Forces in Northern Italy:

"1. Wolff arrived Pesano Friday morning and immediately summoned Parrilli and Zimmer to Pesano where they spent Friday afternoon together. Zimmer was then sent home by Wolff, Parrilli remaining Pesano.

"2. Wolff endeavored contact Vietinghoff before he went to see Kesselring, but was unable to reach him.

"3. Trip to Kesselring most difficult and when he reached Kesselring's headquarters, hell had already broken loose. First conversation took place only 15 km. from our advancing forces. Wolff presented his plan for Italian surrender and Kesselring

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...to go through with it. He, Kesselring, reported he was not alone in Italy.

"4. In a casual conversation with Kesselring, Zinner again expressed his agreement with Wolff's plan and that he should so advise Vietinghoff, but said that on his front he could not go along (with such). Kesselring found himself largely surrounded by strangers whom he did not trust. Zinner gained impression from Wolff Kesselring was half a winner (Our representative in Bern comments that no mention was made of Vietinghoff).

"5. Immediately on his return, Wolff had tried to reach Chanier but he was on an inspection trip at the front and was returning to his headquarters only night of 21. Wolff proposed to see him immediately and would spend Sunday with him. Wolff gave this message to Zinner for our representative in Bern. I am ready to come to a final conversation in order to arrange matters. I hope to come with Bohn, Bollmann and either Vietinghoff or a staff of-

Chanier

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

6. Hans had been called back to Germany but avoided the trip by alleging serious strike conditions in the Ruhr which he had to handle. Hansler did return Germany, but apparently on account of a run with Chancellor Hitler of the Tyrol. Neither was believed to be connected with the main subject in question.

7. While in Germany and one of the reasons for delay, Wolff was summoned by Hansler, who asked him to explain his surrender of British agent Tucker. Wolff replied that he was arranging an exchange and he wanted to give the Fuehrer something as birthday present. Hansler also accused him of having been in Switzerland and asked the reasons. Wolff answered that he had a contact in Milan who promised to bring him in touch with Allies and that he was acting pursuant to Hitler's recent secret order to seek any possible contact with Allies. Wolff had heard that many efforts had failed and wanted to see what he could do. Hansler ordered Wolff to wait around for a couple of days as he wanted to think the matter over.

TOP SECRET

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However, Himmler was suddenly called urgently to Germany and returned Wolff to Kaltenbrunner. Himmler told him that he should now leave Italy and particularly that he should not go to Switzerland. Wolff did not see Kaltenbrunner but left for Italy.

"8. In his conversation with Kesselring, latter said to Wolff our situation is desperate, nobody dares tell truth to Fuehrer who surrounded by small group of advisers who still believe in a last specific secret weapon which they call 'Vermittlungs' weapon. Kesselring believed this weapon can prolong war but not decide it, but might cause terrible blood bath on both sides. Kesselring said if Fuehrer gave his order to use weapon he would surrender his command. End of Himmler report.

"9. Under foregoing program and assuming no further delays which may be inherent in situation, Wolff should come to a meeting sometime Monday or early Tuesday. Any action by Kesselring via Wolff seems excluded. Whether Wolff will win over Vistingshoff is still matter of conjecture, despite Wolff's apparent optimism.

TOP SECRET

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...the support of one of the
...the ...

William J. Johnston
Director

TOP SECRET

Original & one delivered
by RJP. 4/2 - 10:30 St. Hyde.
RJP

TOP SECRET

LA. 100001

1000

appeared in a meeting room
between the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, which was prepared for
the General and signed by him
last night.

He said that I should give
it to you, so that you could
give it to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. He remarked
that it would be a good
opportunity for you to see
General MacArthur.

John W. Archibald
100001

100001

TOP SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The following points previously discussed has just been re-
ceived from the CIA representative in Bonn relating to the most re-
cent developments in connection with the possible surrender of Ger-
man forces in Southern Italy:

4. Wolff arrived Faenza Friday morning and immediately summoned Parrilli and Zimmer to Faenza where they spent Friday afternoon together. Zimmer was then sent here by Wolff, Parrilli remaining Faenza.

"2. Kelly endeavored contact Viotingshoff before he went to see Hesselring, but was unable to reach him.

"5. Trip to Kesselring most difficult and when he reached Kesselring's headquarters, hell had already broken loose. First conversation took place only 10 km. from our advancing forces. Galt presented his plan for Italian surrender and Kesselring advised him to go through with it. He, Kesselring, regretted he was not also in Italy.

"4. In a second conversation with Kesselring, latter again expressed his agreement with Wolff's plan and that he should so advise Vistinghoff, but said that on his front he could not go along (Mitmachen). Kesselring found himself largely surrounded by strangers whom he did not trust. Zimmer gained impression from Wolff Kesselring was half a prisoner (our representative in these comments that no mention was made of Westphal).

3. Immediately on his return, Wolff had tried to reach Glatfelter but he was on an inspection trip at the front and was returning to his headquarters only night of 31. Wolff proposed to see him immediately and would spend Sunday with him.

18. He had been willing to go to Germany but avoided the trip by attending various military exhibitions North Italy which he had to handle. Himmler did return Germany, but apparently on account of a row with Gustaf von Helldorf of the Tyrol. Neither seemed related to be connected with the main subject in question.

19. While in Germany and one of the reasons for delay, Wolff was summoned by Himmler, who asked him to explain his surrender of British agent Fisher. Wolff replied that he was arranging an exchange and he wanted to give the Führer something as birthday present. Himmler also accused him of having been in Switzerland and asked the reasons. Wolff answered that he had a contact in Milan who promised to bring him in touch with Allies and that he was acting pursuant to Führer's recent secret order to seek any possible contact with Allies. Wolff had heard that many efforts had failed and wanted to see what he could do. Himmler ordered Wolff to wait around for couple of days as he wanted to think the matter over. However, Himmler was suddenly called urgently to Hungary and referred Wolff to Kaltenbrunner. Himmler told him that he should not leave Italy and particularly that he should not go to Switzerland. Wolff did not see Kaltenbrunner but left for Italy.

20. In his conversation with Kesselring, latter said to Wolff our situation is desperate, nobody dares tell truth to Führer who surrounded by small group of advisers who still believe in a last specific secret weapon which they call 'Vergeltungs' weapon. Kesselring believed this weapon can prolong war but not decide it, and he was sure of this. Kesselring said if Führer gave him order to use weapon he would surrender his command. End of Himmler report.

21. After foregoing program and announcing no further delays since the situation is desperate, Wolff should come to a meeting sometime

should fully and honestly report to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency the results of their activities.

William J. Donovan
Director

TOP SECRET

1 April 1948

**Honorable Jason G. Dunn
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.**

Dear Sir:

**I think the attached memorandum
will be of interest to the Secretary of State.
Will you please see that it reaches his desk.
Thank you.**

Sincerely,

**William J. Donovan
Director**

Attachment

TOP SECRET

SECRET

"4. In a second conversation with Kesselring, latter again expressed his agreement with Wolff's plan and that he would be advising Vistinghoff, but said that on his front he could not go along (Hitler). Kesselring found himself largely surrounded by strangers whom he did not trust. Zimmer gained impression from Wolff Kesselring was half a prisoner (Our representative in Bern comments that no mention was made of Westphal).

"5. Immediately on his return, Wolff had tried to reach Glaxier but he was on an inspection trip at the front and was returning to his headquarters only night of 31. Wolff proposed to see him immediately and would spend Sunday with him. Wolff gave this message to Zimmer for our representative in Bern: I am ready to come to a final conversation in order to arrange matters. I hope to come with Rahn, Dollman and either Vistinghoff or a staff officer.

"6. Rahn had been called back to Germany but avoided the trip by alleging serious strike conditions North Italy which he had to handle. Harster did return Germany, but apparently on account of a row with Gonsleiter Hofer of the Tyrol. Neither persons believed to be connected with the subject in question.

"7. While in Germany and one of reasons for delay, Wolff was summoned by Himmler, who asked him to explain his sur-

SECRET

- 3 -

SECRET

of British agent Tucker. Wolff replied that he was arranging an exchange and he wanted to give the Fuehrer Huensche as birthday present. Himmler also accused him of having been in Switzerland and asked the reasons. Wolff answered that he had a contact in Milan who promised to bring him in touch with Allies and that he was acting pursuant Fuehrer's recent secret order to seek any possible contact with Allies. Wolff had heard that many efforts had failed and wanted to see what he could do. Himmler ordered Wolff to wait around for couple of days as he wanted to think the matter over. However, Himmler was suddenly called urgently to Hungary and referred Wolff to Kaltenbrunner. Himmler told him that he should not leave Italy and particularly that he should not go to Switzerland. Wolff did not see Kaltenbrunner but left for Italy.

"8. In his conversation with Kesselring, latter said to Wolff our situation is desperate, nobody dares tell truth to Fuehrer who surrounded by small group of advisers who still believe in a last specific secret weapon which they call "Terminallange" weapon. Kesselring believed this weapon can prolong war but not decide it, but might cause terrible blood bath on both sides. Kesselring said if Fuehrer gave him order to the weapon he would surrender his command. End of Zimmer report.

SECRET

"3. Under foregoing program and assuming no further delays which may be inherent in situation, Wolff should come to a meeting sometime Monday or early Tuesday. Any action by Resisting via Wolff seems excluded. Whether Wolff will win over Vistinghoff is still matter of conjecture, despite Wolff's apparent optimism. Zimmer understands Wolff has support of one of Vistinghoff's chief subordinates."

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

TOP SECRET

29 March 1945

General Dinevari

There are attached for your signature memoranda addressed to the President, the Secretary of State, and the Joint Chiefs, based on Bern Cable #7699, of 28 March. This cable deals with further German proposals for termination of hostilities in Italy.

For General Magruder

C. T., Jr.
per JG

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS -- Intelligence Service

15394

29 March 1945

14-107
Gurney
S-65
Place
Legation
TOP SECRET

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be inter-
ested in the enclosed message from our Bern represen-
tative. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk?
Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET**23 March 1945****MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR:**

The following information, transmitted by the OES representative in Bern, is a sequel to memoranda dated 13 and 21 March concerning approaches with a view to terminating German resistance in North Italy made by Obergruppenfuhrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff, the Higher SS and Police Leader in Italy and chief of Hitler's personal staff.

No further word had been received from Wolff by the night of 16 March.

On 19 March, Wolff stated to Allied representatives that he was leaving by car for Kesselring's headquarters and hoped, if he were successful in persuading Kesselring, to return within a week with qualified representatives of both Kesselring and the German commander in Italy, von Vietinghoff.⁷

Wolff's aide, Blumstein, however, reports that both Friedrich Bohn, German Ambassador to the Hungarian regime in Berlin, and Generalleutnant der Polizei Wilhelm Harster,

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... of the Security Police in Italy and Wolff's subordi-
nates, have been recalled to Germany for conferences at Hitler's
headquarters. Harster probably has some knowledge of Wolff's
activities.

At the time of the first approach from Standarten-
führer Dollman, Wolff's associate, Harster tele-
graphed Himmler that an attempt to contact the
Giles in Switzerland was probable. Harster later
explained to Wolff that he had done this to cover
Dollman's movements. Though Wolff has described
Harster as dependable, confirmatory evidence is
lacking.

The OSS representative considers that it is becoming
increasingly apparent that Hitler intends to use the bulk of
the German forces in Italy for the defense of the German "re-
douit".

William J. Donovan
Director

Doc. 1011 - 17699 - D/AM/AS. (CONFIDENTIAL)

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

16701

6-7-45

29 March 1945

**MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION
FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF****SUBJECT: Further German Proposals for Termination
of Hostilities in Italy**

The following information, transmitted by the GSG representative in Bonn, is a sequel to memoranda dated 19 and 21 March concerning approaches with a view to terminating German resistance in North Italy made by Obergruppenfuhrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff, the Higher SS and Police Leader in Italy and chief of Himmler's personal staff.

No further word had been received from Wolff by the night of 26 March.

On 19 March, Wolff stated to Allied representatives that he was leaving by car for Kesselring's headquarters and hoped, if he were successful in persuading Kesselring, to return within a week with qualified representatives of both Kesselring and the German commander in Italy, von Vietinghoff.

Wolff's aide, Zimmer, however, reports that both Heinrich Himmler, German Ambassador to the Mussolini regime in North Italy, and Generalleutnant der Polizei Wilhelm Beyer,

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commander of the German Police in Italy and Wolff's subordinates, have been recalled to Germany for conference at Hitler's headquarters. Harster probably has some knowledge of Wolff's activities.

At the time of the first approach from Standarten-Fuhrer Bollmann, Wolff's associate, Harster telegraphed Kattenbrenner that an attempt to contact the Allies in Switzerland was probable. Harster later explained to Wolff that he had done this to cover Bollmann's movements. Though Wolff has described Harster as dependable, confirmatory evidence is lacking.

The OSS representative comments that it is becoming increasingly apparent that Hitler intends to use the bulk of the German forces in Italy for the defense of the German "re-
douit".

William J. Donovan
Director

See Cable #7699 - 3/28/45. (SUMMER)

TOP SECRET

16107
Date 663

TOP SECRET

29 March 1945

Honorable James C. Dunn
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State

Dear Jimmy:

I think the enclosed message from our
representative in Bern will be of interest to the
Secretary. Will you be good enough to see that it
reaches him? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

19 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF ARMY:

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, in a sequel to memoranda dated 13 and 21 March concerning approaches with a view to terminating German resistance in North Italy made by Obergruppenfuhrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff, the Higher SS and Police Leader in Italy and chief of Kessler's personal staff.

No further word had been received from Wolff by the night of 26 March.

On 19 March, Wolff stated to Allied representatives that he was leaving by car for Kessler's headquarters and hoped, if he were successful in persuading Kessler, to return within a week with qualified representatives of both Kessler and the German commander in Italy, von Vietinghoff.

Wolff's aide, Ziemann, however, reports that both Heinrich Himmler, German Commander to the Mussolini regime in North Italy, and Generalleutnant der Polizei Wilhelm Harster, commander of the Security Police in Italy and Wolff's subordi-

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... have been mentioned in connection with performances at Hitler's headquarters. ... probably has some knowledge of Wolff's activities.

At the time of the first approach from Standartenführer Bollmann, Wolff's associate, Harster telegraphed Eisenhower that an attempt to contact the Allies in Switzerland was probable. Harster later explained to Wolff that he had done this to cover Bollmann's movements. Though Wolff has described Harster as dependable, confirmatory evidence is lacking.

The GMI representative comments that it is becoming increasingly apparent that Hitler intends to use the bulk of the German forces in Italy for the defense of the German "re-sonat".

William J. Donovan
Director

Re: Cable 07/31 - 3/28/45 (CONFIDENTIAL)

TOP SECRET

SECRET

20 March 1963

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

I am attaching brief biographical records on Kneeling and Vichinghoff, which I would appreciate having brought to the President's attention in connection with my memorandum of yesterday.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mrs. Wright

DATE: 22 March 1945

FROM : Col. Keller, Biographical Records

SUBJECT: Biographical data on Kesselring and Vietinghoff

1. Enclosed are two copies each of revised accounts and two photos.
2. The revision or expansion was undertaken to give you a more complete picture.

General Donovan

*You sent one set to Sen. Trumbull
last night.*

You asked for one for Mr. President

14 007
SECRET**NAME:** **KUNDEL, Albert****DATE:** **Generalleutnant, Luftwaffe (Field Marshal, GAF), since 10 July 1940****PRESENT COMMAND:** **Commander in Chief, South West and Army Group C****DATE OF BIRTH AND PLACE:** **31 November 1888, Marktstett (Lower Franconia)****EDUCATION:** **His father was a municipal school supervisor.****ARMY SERVICE:****10 July 1904****Joined 2nd Bayerische Fuss-Artillerie Regiment as an ensign.****Before World War I****Was trained as a balloon observer.****World War I****Served as brigade adjutant and general staff officer in the Bayerische Fuss-Artillerie Regiment and later on in the 3rd Bayerische Arme Korps.****At the end of the war, remained in the Reichswehr with the rank of Hauptmann (captain). Served for a short while with his former artillery regiment and then was given appointments in the Reichswehr Ministry and on the general staff.****1 February 1931****Appointed battery commander in the 4th artillery regiment.****1 October 1932****Promoted to the rank of colonel.****About 1933****Transferred to the Luftwaffe (air force), and appointed Chief of the Administrative Branch in the Air Ministry. (It is reported that he later relinquished this post because of a disagreement with General Hinkel)****1 October 1934****Promoted to Major General.****25 April 1936****Promoted to Lieutenant General.****9 June 1938****Appointed Chief, Luftwaffe (air force) General Staff.****1 June 1939****Promoted to General der Flieger and made commanding general and Befehlshaber (commander) in Luftkreis 3 (air corps area) in Bracon.****SECRET**

SECRET

Page Two

1 January 1939

Chief der Luftflotte (air fleet) I
in Berlin and Berlin-Brandenburg (commander)
Ost (East).

1939

Commanded the First Air Fleet in Poland.

15 September 1939

After the Polish campaign, received the
Knights Cross of the Iron Cross

1940

Commanded the Second Air Fleet in France.

15 July 1940

Promoted to Field Marshal by Hitler in
the Reichstag session celebrating victory
in the west.

Summer 1940

From summer 1940 to beginning of campaign
against Russia, fought with his formations
against Britain.

1941

Commanded an Air Fleet in Russia.

1941--

Transferred to Southern theater in sup-
reme command of all air forces in the
Mediterranean and Africa.

25 February 1942

Awarded the Oak Leaves.

15 July 1942

Awarded the Swords to the Oak Leaves.

Autumn 1942--

Army group commander.

21 July 1944

Awarded Diamonds to the Oak Leaves with
Swords.

Kesselring has been the object of many rumors. On 1 January 1940, The New York Times reported an Order of the Day by Hitler (signed 27 November 1939) commending Kesselring's death. A report from Berno (12 November 1944) re-ported him wounded by an Allied plane, after the German European Service (21 July 1944) had admitted that he was slightly wounded. The Nazis have frequently praised his masterly strategy and reported that he was shot down 5 times in over 120 flights.

He is variously reported to be a member of the Nazi Party and to be not a member, to be a close friend of Goering and to be his rival.

On 10 March 1945 The New York Times published an order by Kesselring addressed to Hermann von Salmuth, commander of the 25th division to "defend every inch of Italian territory as if they were fighting on the soil of Germany itself".

SECRET

SECRET**Colonel von WITTMANN's military career****Rank:** Lieutenant (colonel general)**Branch of service:** Prussian Army**Birth date and place:** 11 December 1887, Mainz**Religion:** Protestant**Family:** Married; wife, daughter of Colonel Ludwig Wagner, 6 January 1920 in Berlin; three children.**Parents:** Himself is the son of Generalleutnant Heinrich School von Wittinghoff and Emma Gräfin von Heintzen.**Military career****Attended Prussian Cadet schools (Cadet Corps) (prior to 1906)****1906** Fähnrich (officer candidate)**1907** Second lieutenant**1911** First lieutenant and regimental adjutant**1914-1916** Member of Kaiser-Franz-Grenadier-Regiment**1916-1918** Member of General Staff**1918** Member of the Operational Section of the Supreme Command (Ludendorff's Staff)

Received twelve military decorations, including one Turkish and one Bulgarian award.

1918-1919 Member of the Reichswehr**1919** Joined the War Ministry**1921** Joined staff of First Army Group in Berlin**1924-1925** Company commander in the 9th Prussian Infantry Regiment**1 March 1928** Promoted to major over 100 captains senior to him.**1928-1929** Member of staff of Commander of Infantry in the Second Division**1929-1931** Member of the National Defense Department of the Reichswehr (War Office)**1 January 1931** Promoted to lieutenant colonel**SECRET**

SECRET

1931-1932 Commander of the 1st Bn. of the 14th Infantry Regiment
 1 March 1931 Head of a section in the National War Ministry
 1932 Promoted to colonel
 1935 Promoted to Generalmajor (brigadier general).
 Participated in the establishment of the German
 panzer arm and commanded the 1st Motorized Infantry
 Brigade in the First Panzer Division.
 1937 Director of Armored Troops and Army Motorization
 in the War Department
 1 March 1938 Promoted to Generalleutnant (major general)
 November 1938 Commander of the Fifth Panzer Division
 (another source mentions him as commander of the
 First Panzer Division at that time).
 1940 Commanded 13th Infantry Corps in the invasion of
 France and took part in action south of the
 Ardennes canal.
 19 July 1940 Promoted to General der Panzertruppen (General of
 Armored Troops, equivalent to the rank of lieutenant
 general). Received the Knight's Cross decoration.
 1941-1942 Commander of the XLVth Panzer Corps in the Balkans
 and Russia
 September 1942 Relieved of his command on the eastern front.
 Promoted to Generaloberst (colonel general or full
 general).
 Feb.-Sept. 1943 Commander of the 15th Army in the West
 September 1943 Transferred to the Italian front.
 Oct.-Dec. 1944 Temporary commander of Army Group G.
 Holder of the Oak Leaflet to the Knight's Cross.

Fiebighoff is described as a man who "likes Hitler but dislikes the
 First Party". Although reportedly "playing an increasingly important
 role in the German army leadership" Fiebighoff "could probably not be
 selected as Chief of the General Staff; it is possible, however, that
 he might succeed General Guderian as Inspector General of Panzer Troops".

Prepared by **Biographical Records**
 21 March 1945

SECRET

SECRET

April 1933: Commander of the 1st Bn. of the 14th Infantry Regiment
 1 March 1933: Head of a section in the National War Ministry
 April 1933: Promoted to colonel
 April 1933: Promoted to Generalmajor (brigadier general)
 Participated in the establishment of the German
 panzer arm and commanded the 1st Motorized Infantry
 Brigade in the First Panzer Division.
 1937: Inspector of Armored Troops and Army Motorization
 in the War Department
 1 March 1938: Promoted to Generalleutnant (major general)
 November 1938: Commander of the Fifth Panzer Division
 (Another source mentions him as commander of the
 1st Panzer Division at that time).
 1940: Commanded 13th Infantry Corps in the invasion of
 France and took part in action south of the
 Ardennes canal.
 19 July 1940: Promoted to General der Panzertuppen (General of
 Armored Troops, equivalent to the rank of lieutenant
 general). Received the Knight's Cross decoration.
 1941-1942: Commander of the XLVth Panzer Corps in the Balkans
 and Russia
 September 1942: Relieved of his command on the eastern front.
 Promoted to Generalleutnant (colonel general or full
 general).
 Feb.-Sept. 1943: Commander of the 15th Army in the West
 September 1943: Transferred to the Italian front.
 Oct.-Dec. 1944: Temporary commander of Army Group G.
 Holder of the Oak Leaflet to the Knight's Cross.

Vietinghoff is described as a man who "likes Hitler but dislikes the
 Nazi Party". Although reportedly "playing an increasingly important
 role in the German army leadership" Vietinghoff "would probably not be
 selected as Chief of the General Staff; it is possible, however, that
 he might succeed General Guderian as Inspector General of Panzer Troops".

Prepared by [illegible] [illegible]

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21 March 1945

General Donovan:

There are attached for your signature memoranda addressed to the President, the Sec'y of State, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, based on Bern cable #7329, of 20 March. This is a sequel to your memoranda of 13 March, also sent to the above three, concerning continued negotiations for the surrender of German troops in North Italy.

For General Magruder

C. T., Jr.

also to be made

per CTT

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS -- Intelligence Service

~~RUSH~~ TOP SECRET

21 March 1945

General Donovan: *not 2 4 1*

There are attached for your signature memoranda addressed to the President, the Sec'y of State, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, based on Bern cable #7329, of 20 March. This is a sequel to your memoranda of 13 March, also sent to the above three, concerning continued negotiations for the surrender of German troops in North Italy.

For General Magruder

C. T., Jr.

*per RWT**also to Marshall*

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS -- Intelligence Service

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[Faint handwritten notes at the bottom of the page]

2000

Sincerely yours,

12-11-1964

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TOP SECRET**23 March 1945****MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR:**

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Rome, in a signal to memorandum dated 18 March concerning approach with a view to terminating German resistance in North Italy made by Obergruppenfuhrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff, the Higher SS and Police leader in Italy and chief of Hitler's personal staff. It is a summary of statements made by Wolff to OSS representatives and representatives of Field Marshal Alexander at a place near Locarno on 18 March. Marshal Alexander's representatives gave no name or rank but represented themselves to Wolff as advisors of the OSS representative. The OSS representative makes no attempt to predict whether Wolff's plan can be realized, but reports that Wolff, himself, appeared determined and that those who have had close contact with Wolff since he made his first approach ten days ago are inclined to believe that he is sincere in his expressed desire to effect an immediate German surrender. Wolff has stressed particularly that it would be a crime against the German people if the "realt plan" were realized, since it would merely bring about further useless destruction and slaughter.

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This information has been transmitted by the representatives in Switzerland of Field Marshal Alexander by direct radio to AFHQ.

Wolff stated that as a clear duty to his country he had been prepared to proceed with his plans to effect the surrender of the German forces in Italy. The absence of Marshal Kesselring, however, compelled him to change his course of action. Wolff reported on 18 March that Kesselring had gone to Hitler's headquarters, but that he expected him back in three days. Wolff said that his next step now depends upon the time at his disposal for action. If he had virtually no time at all, he would be forced to see what he could do alone. If he had less than a week, he would deal directly with Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Vietinghoff, who was returning to Italy to take over Kesselring's command and probably reached his Italian headquarters on 18 March. If he had seven days or more, Wolff said he would go at once to Kesselring, whom he more than ever considered the key to the situation both in Italy and on the Western Front.

Kesselring, Wolff reported, has been assigned to General von Rundstedt's command in the West, and had not even

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was allowed by Hitler's headquarters to return to Italy to pick up his effects. Thus Wolff had not been able to see Himmler; also Wolff's first meeting with the OSS representative ten days ago.

Wierzbicki, who acted as deputy commander in Italy for Himmler while the latter was recovering from his injuries, had gone to Germany on leave in mid-January, and subsequently had held a brief command in Poland on the Eastern Front. After a brief conference at Hitler's headquarters he was ordered to return to Italy to assume command.

Wolff said that if he were compelled to act alone he had only the following heterogeneous forces, equipped only with light arms and a few old tanks, at his disposal. In his capacity as Higher SS and Police Leader, a post which he has held since 1942, he commands some 15,000 Germans; 10,000 Soviet troops, mostly Russians and Ukrainians and Turkomen; 10,000 Serbs; 10,000 Hungarians; 5,000 Czechs; an Italian legion; and 100,000 Italians. As ~~Reichsfuhrer of the German Reich~~ ~~Reichsfuhrer of the German Reich~~ (plenipotentiary for the German Reich), a post which he has held since the 30 July 1942, he is in direct command of 10,000 Germans, and has under his traditional command some 85,000 German divisions of supply and similar troops, all north of the Po River.

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Wolff admitted frankly that the non-German forces under his command are not very dependable, and that were he to begin active plans, without prior coordination with the OKW, he would probably be caught between German armies to the north and south of his position.

Asked whether a direct approach to von Vietinghoff might meet with success, Wolff said that von Vietinghoff is a non-political soldier who would not take political action without support from others in the Wehrmacht. Wolff declared his relations with von Vietinghoff to be excellent, but said he had not prepared the ground with von Vietinghoff as he had with Kesselring. Hence, Wolff proposed that he proceed at once by car to Kesselring's headquarters, since he could not fly there for technical reasons, and seek to persuade Kesselring and General-Lieutenant Siegfried Westphal to join him in common action. If they agreed to do so, Wolff said he felt sure that von Vietinghoff would cooperate.

If he were successful, Wolff said that he hoped to bring back with him within a week qualified military representatives of both Kesselring's and von Vietinghoff's headquarters to discuss the details of a military surrender. Wolff declared

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THE BOSTON GLOBE

and he mentioned that the rapidly developing military situation was very serious. He stated that German bombers were in Italy en masse and that offensive there before the end of the month. He also stated he could see attack was expected by the Germans. He said he would leave Italy on the evening of the 10th.

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Form C-10 (Rev. 10-12-60) - 10 March 1961.

TOP SECRET

21 March 1949

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08136111

Honorable James C. Dunn
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State

Dear Jimmy:

I believe the Secretary will be interested in the enclosed memorandum, which forms a sequel to my memorandum of 13 March. Will you kindly see that it reaches him? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure

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21 March 1945

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, is a sequel to memorandum dated 13 March concerning approach with a view to terminating German resistance in North Italy made by Obergruppenfuhrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff, the Higher SS and Police Leader in Italy and chief of Himmler's personal staff. It is a summary of statements made by Wolff to OSS representatives and representatives of Field Marshal Alexander at a place near Locarno on 19 March. Marshal Alexander's representatives gave no name or rank but represented themselves to Wolff as advisors of the OSS representative. The OSS representative makes no attempt to predict whether Wolff's plan can be realized, but reports that Wolff, himself, appeared determined and that those who have had close contact with Wolff since he made his first approach ten days ago are inclined to believe that he is sincere in his expressed desire to effect an immediate German surrender. Wolff has stressed particularly that it would be a crime against the German people if the "Wolff plan" were realized, since it would merely cause untold further useless destruction and slaughter.

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This information has been transmitted by the representative in Britain and of Field Marshal Alexander by direct radio to AFHQ.

Wolff stated that as a clear duty to his country he had been prepared to proceed with his plans to effect the surrender of the German Armies in Italy. The absence of Marshal Kesselring, however, compelled him to change his course of action. Wolff reported on 12 March that Kesselring had gone to Hitler's headquarters, but that he expected him back in three days. Wolff said that his next step now depends upon the time at his disposal for action. If he had virtually no time at all, he would be forced to see what he could do alone. If he had less than a week, he would deal directly with Generaloberst Heinrich von Vietinghoff, who was returning to Italy to take over Kesselring's command and probably reached his Italian headquarters on 19 March. If he had some days or more, Wolff said he would go at once to Kesselring, whom he more than ever considered the key to the situation both in Italy and on the Western Front.

Kesselring, Wolff reported, has been assigned to Marshal von Rundstedt's command in the West, and had not even been allowed by Hitler's headquarters to return to Italy to pack up his effects. Thus Wolff has not been able to see Kesselring since Wolff's first

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...ing with the GCH representative ten days ago.

Wittlinghoff, who acted as deputy commander in Italy for Rommel while the latter was recovering from his injury, had gone to Germany on leave in mid-January, and subsequently had held a brief command in Eastland on the Eastern Front. After a brief conference at Hitler's headquarters he was ordered to return to Italy to assume command.

Wolff said that if he were compelled to act alone he had only the following heterogeneous forces, equipped only with light arms and a few old tanks, at his disposal. In his capacity as Higher SS and Police leader, a post which he has held since 1943, he commands some 15,000 Germans; 20,000 Soviet troops, mostly Don and Kuban Cossacks and Turkomen; 10,000 Serbs; 10,000 Slovaks; 5,000 Croats; an Indian legion; and 100,000 Italians. As Bevollmachtigter General der Deutschen Wehrmacht (plenipotentiary for the German Wehrmacht), a post which he has held since the 20 July putsch, he is in direct command of 10,000 Germans, and has under his tactical command some 55,000 German services of supply and similar troops, all north of the Po River.

Wolff admitted frankly that the non-German forces under his command are not very dependable, and that were he to take action alone, without prior coordination with the OKW, he would

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probably be caught between German armies to the north and south of his position.

Asked whether a direct approach to von Vietinghoff might meet with success, Wolff said that von Vietinghoff is a non-political soldier who could not take political action without support from others in the Wehrmacht. Wolff declared his relations with von Vietinghoff to be excellent, but said he had not prepared the ground with von Vietinghoff as he had with Kesselring. Hence, Wolff proposed that he proceed at once by car to Kesselring's headquarters, since he could not fly there for technical reasons, and seek to persuade Kesselring and Generalleutnant Siegfried Westphal to join him in common action. If they agreed to do so, Wolff said he felt sure that von Vietinghoff would cooperate.

If he were successful, Wolff said that he hoped to bring back with him within a week qualified military representatives of both Kesselring's and von Vietinghoff's headquarters to discuss the details of a military surrender. Wolff declared that he realized that the rapidly developing military situation left him little time for action. He added that German Headquarters in Italy requested an Allied offensive there before the end

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of the month (in one person he said the attack was expected by
21 March). He returned back into Italy on the evening of 19
March.

William J. Donovan
Director

Burn Cable #7329 - 20 March 1945.

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TOP SECRET**21 March 1945****UNCLASSIFIED NON TECHNICAL MATTER**

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, concerns approaches with a view to terminating German resistance in North Italy made by Obergruppenfuhrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff, the Higher SS and Police Leader in Italy and chief of Hitler's personal staff. It is a summary of statements made by Wolff to OSS representatives and representatives of Field Marshal Alexander at a place near Locarno on 19 March. Marshal Alexander's representatives gave no name or rank but represented themselves to Wolff as advisors of the OSS representative. The OSS representative makes no attempt to predict whether Wolff's plan can be realized, but reports that Wolff, himself, appeared determined and that those who have had close contact with Wolff since he made his first approach ten days ago are inclined to believe that he is sincere in his expressed desire to effect an immediate German surrender. Wolff has stressed particularly that it would be a crime against the German people if the "rehab plan" were realized, since it could merely cause untold further useless destruction and slaughter.

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- 2 -

This information has been transmitted by the representative in Switzerland of Field Marshal Alexander by direct radio to AFHQ.

Wolff stated that as a clear duty to his country he had been prepared to proceed with his plans to effect the surrender of the German Armies in Italy. The absence of Marshal Kesselring, however, compelled him to change his course of action. Wolff reported on 12 March that Kesselring had gone to Hitler's headquarters, but that he expected him back in three days.⁷ Wolff said that his next step now depends upon the time at his disposal for action. If he had virtually no time at all, he would be forced to see what he could do alone. If he had less than a week, he would deal directly with Generaloberst Heinrich von Vietinghoff, who was returning to Italy to take over Kesselring's command and probably reached his Italian headquarters on 15 March. If he had seven days or more, Wolff said he would go at once to Kesselring, whom he more than ever considered the key to the situation both in Italy and on the Western Front.

Kesselring, Wolff reported, has been assigned to Marshal von Rundstedt's command in the West, and had not even

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been allowed by Hitler's headquarters to return to Italy to pack up his effects. Thus Wolff had not been able to see Kesselring since Wolff's first meeting with the OSS representative ten days ago.

Vietinghoff, who acted as deputy commander in Italy for Kesselring while the latter was recovering from his injuries, had gone to Germany on leave in mid-January, and subsequently had held a brief command in Holland on the Eastern Front. After a brief conference at Hitler's headquarters he was ordered to return to Italy to assume command.

Wolff said that if he were compelled to act alone he had only the following heterogeneous forces, equipped only with light arms and a few old tanks, at his disposal. In his capacity as Higher SS and Police leader, a post which he has held since 1943, he commands some 15,000 Germans; 20,000 Soviet troops, mostly Don and Kuban Cossacks and Turkomans; 10,000 Serbs; 10,000 Slovaks; 5,000 Czechs; an Indian legion; and 100,000 Italians. As *Reichsaussenminister General der Deutschen Wehrmacht* (plenipotentiary for the German Wehrmacht), a post which he had held since the 20 July putsch, he is in direct command of 10,000 Germans, and has under his tactical command some 35,000 German services of supply and smaller troops, all north of the Po River.

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Wolff admitted frankly that the non-German forces under his command are not very dependable, and that were he to take action alone, without prior coordination with the OKW, he would probably be caught between German armies to the north and south of his forces.

Asked whether a direct approach to von Vietinghoff might meet with success, Wolff said that von Vietinghoff is a non-political soldier who would not take political action without support from others in the Wehrmacht. Wolff declared his relations with von Vietinghoff to be excellent, but said he had not prepared the ground with von Vietinghoff as he had with Kesselring. Hence, Wolff proposed that he proceed at once by car to Kesselring's headquarters, since he could not fly there for technical reasons, and seek to persuade Kesselring and Generalleutnant Siegfried Westphal to join him in common action. If they agreed to do so, Wolff said he felt sure that von Vietinghoff would cooperate.

If he were successful, Wolff said that he hoped to bring back with him within a week qualified military representatives of both Kesselring's and von Vietinghoff's headquarters to discuss the details of a military surrender. Wolff declared

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that he realized that the rapidly developing military situation left him little time for action. He added that German Headquarters in Italy expected an Allied offensive there before the end of the month (to one person he said the attack was expected by 15 March). Wolff crossed back into Italy on the evening of 15 March.

William J. Donovan
Director

Bern Cable #7329 - 20 March 1945.

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that he realized that the rapidly developing military situation left him little time for action. He added that German Headquarters in Italy expected an Allied offensive there before the end of the month (to one person he said the attack was expected by 25 March). Wolff crossed back into Italy on the evening of 19 March.

William J. Donovan
Director

Burn Cable #7329 - 20 March 1945.

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21 March 1943

**MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION
FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:****SUBJECT: Further Proposals for Termination of Hostilities
in Italy.**

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, is a sequel to memoranda dated 13 March concerning approaches with a view to terminating German resistance in North Italy made by Obergruppenfuhrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff, the Higher SS and Police leader in Italy and chief of Hitler's personal staff. It is a summary of statements made by Wolff to OSS representatives and representatives of Field Marshal Alexander at a place near Locarno on 19 March. Marshal Alexander's representatives gave no name or rank but represented themselves to Wolff as advisers of the OSS representative. The OSS representative makes no attempt to predict whether Wolff's plan can be realized, but reports that Wolff, himself, appeared determined and that those who have had close contact with Wolff since he made his first approach ten days ago are inclined to believe that he is sincere in his expressed desire to effect an immediate German surrender. Wolff has stressed particularly that it would be a crime against the German people if the "reduit plan" were realized, since it would merely cause untold further useless destruction and slaughter.

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This information has been transmitted by the representation in Switzerland of Field Marshal Alexander by direct radio to Adolf.

Wolff stated that as a clear duty to his country he had been prepared to proceed with his plans to effect the surrender of the German Armies in Italy. The absence of Marshal Kesselring, however, compelled him to change his course of action. Wolff reported on 12 March that Kesselring had gone to Hitler's headquarters, but that he expected him back in three days. Wolff said that his next step now depends upon the time at his disposal for action. If he had virtually no time at all, he would be forced to see what he could do alone. If he had less than a week, he would deal directly with Generaloberst Heinrich von Vietinghoff, who was returning to Italy to take over Kesselring's command and probably reached his Italian headquarters on 19 March. If he had seven days or more, Wolff said he would go at once to Kesselring, whom he more than ever considered the key to the situation both in Italy and on the Western Front.

Kesselring, Wolff reported, has been assigned to Marshal von Rundstedt's command in the West, and had not even been allowed by Hitler's headquarters to return to Italy to pack up his effects. Thus Wolff had not been able to see Kesselring

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since his first meeting with the GDR representative ten days ago.

Wolff, who acted as deputy commander in Italy for Kesselring while the latter was recovering from his injuries, had gone to Germany on leave in mid-January, and subsequently had held a brief command in Holland on the Eastern Front. After a brief conference at Hitler's headquarters he was ordered to return to Italy to resume command.

Wolff said that if he were compelled to act alone he had only the following heterogeneous forces, equipped only with light arms and a few old tanks, at his disposal. In his capacity as Higher SS and Police leader, a post which he has held since 1943, he commands some 15,000 Germans; 30,000 Soviet troops, mostly Don and Kuban Cossacks and Turkomans; 10,000 Hungars; 10,000 Crovians; 1,000 Czechs; an Indian legion; and 100,000 Italians. As ~~German Ambassador General der Infanterie~~ (plenipotentiary for the German Wehrmacht), a post which he has held since the 30 July push, he is in direct command of 10,000 Germans, and has under his tactical command some 55,000 German services of supply and similar troops, all north of the Po River.

Wolff admitted frankly that the non-German forces under his command are not very dependable, and that were he to take action alone, without prior coordination with the GDR, he would probably be caught between German armies to the north and south of his forces.

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Wolff said that von Vistinghoff might not like him. Wolff said that von Vistinghoff is a non-political officer and would not take political action without support from others in the Government. Wolff declared his relations with von Vistinghoff to be excellent, but said he had not prepared the ground with von Vistinghoff as he had with Kesselring. Hence, Wolff proposed that he proceed at once by car to Kesselring's headquarters, since he could not fly there for technical reasons, and seek to persuade Kesselring and Generalleutnant Siegfried Westphal to join him in common action. If they agreed to do so, Wolff said he felt sure that von Vistinghoff would cooperate.

If he were successful, Wolff said that he hoped to bring back with him within a week qualified military representatives of both Kesselring's and von Vistinghoff's headquarters to discuss the details of a military surrender. Wolff declared that he realized that the rapidly developing military situation left him little time for action. He added that German Headquarters in Italy expected an Allied offensive there before the end of the month (to one person he said the attack was expected by 15 March). Wolff crossed back into Italy on the evening of 19 March.

William J. Donovan
Director

Radio Ghibli #7329 - 20 March 1945.

TOP SECRET

11 March 1945

11 March 1945

General George C. Marshall
Chief of Staff
Room 3D 921, The Pentagon
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Marshall:

Enclosed you will find brief biographies
of Albert Kesselring and Heinrich von Vietinghoff
(Schaeel) in connection with my memorandum to you of
this date.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

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 In den Gemein
 Mausem

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Roll 38

D (continued)

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
3101 CONSTITUTION AVENUE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

December 19, 1941

Mr. William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Donovan:

REC-20 1341

I have your letter of November 24, 1941 by the hand of Mr. Denis regarding his mission to the Belgian Congo and French Equatorial Africa to acquire a group of portulacs.

After discussing the matter fully with Mr. Denis I have furnished him with letters to the Governor General of the Belgian Congo and the High Commissioner for French Equatorial Africa.

You may be assured I appreciate that the interest of your office in the matter is extremely confidential.

Yours sincerely,

Frank B. Jewett
Frank B. Jewett
President

December 18, 1941

Mrs. Ruth Shipley
State Department
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mrs. Shipley:

We have arranged to send Mr. Armand Denis
on a special mission to Africa. Passages and
other arrangements have been completed and I should
greatly appreciate it if you could issue him a
passport.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

December 20, 1941

MEMORANDUM TO COLONEL DONOVAN:

To remind you kindly to telephone
Mr. Howland Shaw and to advise him of Mr. Armand
Denis' projected visit to Africa and that he
should go on a special passport marked "Secret".

David Bruce

B:CC

MR. DONOVAN
 MR. FARRER
 MR. GALE
 MR. HENRY
 MR. JONES
 MR. LADD
 MR. NICHOLS
 MR. ROSEN
 MR. TRACY
 MR. WHELAN
 MR. WINTERROWD
 MR. BELMONT
 MR. CLEGG
 MR. GLAVIN
 MR. HARBO
 MR. MOHR
 MR. QUINN TAMM
 MR. NEASE
 MR. GANDY

DONOVAN & FARRER
 1000 15th St. N.W.
 Washington, D.C.

Handwritten:
 to Mr. Jones
 file

December 10, 1941.

Col. William J. Donovan,
 Coordinator of Information,
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

I saw Mr. Jones this morning and
 was very happy to give him a letter which I think
 will be of assistance to him.

Furthermore, I just had lunch with
 your very distinguished brother who wears the
 cloth. He is always very interesting and a great
 credit to you.

I hope we can get together soon.

Sincerely yours,

Basil O'Connor

Mr. ARMAND DENIS

December 9, 1941

Mr. Armand Denis
Dania, Florida

If convenient would like you to come here
December 15th for further discussions. Please
advise.

David Bruce

Official

✓
Denis
TELEGRAM - OFFICIAL BUSINESS

NOVEMBER 12, 1941

ARMAND DENIS
DENIS-ROOSEVELT EXPEDITIONS, INC.
7 WASHINGTON SQUARE, NORTH
NEW YORK, NEW YORK

PLEASE TELEGRAPH ME 716 JACKSON PLACE, WASHINGTON, DC RE I
CA. REACH YOU BY TELEPHONE. COLONEL LOWMYER WOULD LIKE TO
SEE YOU WHENEVER YOU CAN BE HERE. I REPLY.

DAVID ROOSE

B:CC

WUB58 59 NT

TDWZ HOLLYWOOD FLO NOV 29 1941

DAVID BRUCE

DEC 1 1941

OFFICE COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

AM SOMEWHAT RELIEVED AT DEPARTURE LESS IMMINENT THAN EXPECTED
HOPE I MAY DISPOSE OF ESSENTIAL PHASES LAW SUIT HERE FOR
DEPARTURE AND AM DOING ALL I CAN TO THIS PURPOSE MEANWHILE
HAVE MADE GOOD START AND AM PUSHING PREPARATIONS ACTIVELY
PLEASE LET ME KNOW WHEN ADVISABLE GO TO WASHINGTON FOR
MEETING WITH RETURN MISSIONS REGARDS

ARMAID DENIS.

1014AM

Phone
Armed Arm
Files

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 29, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN JAMES ROOSEVELT:

The President signed and sent the
suggested letter to Armed Arm.

Grace G. Tully
GRACE G. TULLY

ORIG: ARMB

November 27, 1941

STRAIGHT TIRE - OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Mr. Armand Denis
Orlando, Florida

TWO MISSIONS RETURNING HERE FAIRLY SOON
FROM REGION DISCUSSED. FEEL YOU SHOULD WAIT
AND THEN. EARLIEST TRANSPORTATION
AVAILABLE PROBABLY ABOUT JANUARY FIRST.
MAKE YOUR PLANS ACCORDINGLY.

DAVID BRUCE

B:CC

MEMORANDUM

November 27, 1941

I saw Mr. Frank Oledhill of Pan American Airways this morning. He is going to Africa about December 6th and will be the head representative of the company in its operations there, with Accra as his headquarters. In his absence from Accra, James H. Smith will be in charge and, in the absence of both of them, John Yeomans. With regard to Denis' trip to Africa, if he leaves around the first of the year he should, before doing so, contact W. B. Dixby at Pan American's office in New York and have Mr. Dixby put him in touch with Yeomans if Yeomans is still in this country, or with whoever else is most familiar with the African operation. It is believed that Denis' trip can be greatly amplified and assisted through Pan American.

D. B.

B:CC

November 26, 1941

A. D.

Questions to be answered if possible

Since it can be assumed that the information gathered by our military and naval missions regarding military and naval matters in the Belgian Congo and French Equatorial Africa is fairly complete, you can disregard those subjects in the two territories mentioned unless you come upon some new information to which it is reasonable to believe they did not have access. We would, however, like to have your observations on the state of mind of the peoples, ~~the~~ vis-a-vis the Axis and Democratic Powers, with particular attention to the attitude of the native chieftains and the white officials, together with studies on climate, weather (with its seasonal variations), clothing, disease, road communications, supplies of water and food, evidence of Axis activity with particular regard to radio broadcasting, reaction of the populations to all foreign broadcasts, number of receiving sets, etc.

If you can effect an entrance into Vichy-controlled territory, your observations there should follow in general the same line as those above referred

-2-

to, including any information regarding military matters, such as airfields, etc. Obviously, it is more important from our standpoint to have information bearing upon conditions in the French colonies than elsewhere. In this instance, your report on all the above matters should include an estimate of how large a force of occupying white troops could live off the country along the southern fringe of the Sahara, etc., together with any procurable general data on mineral deposits in the regions surveyed.

It would no doubt be most helpful to you to establish contact with any Pan American Airways representatives in that portion of Africa.

November 26, 1941

A. D.

Questions to be answered if possible:

Since it can be assumed that the information gathered by our military and naval missions regarding military and naval matters in the Belgian Congo and French Equatorial Africa is fairly complete, you can disregard those subjects in the two territories mentioned unless you come upon some new information to which it is reasonable to believe they did not have access. We would, however, like to have your observations on the State of Mind of the peoples there vis-a-vis the Axis and Democratic Powers, with particular attention to the attitude of the native chieftains and the White officials, together with studies on climate, (weather with its seasonal variations), clothing, disease, road communications, supplies of water and food, evidence of Axis activity with particular regard to radio broadcasting, reaction of the populations to all foreign broadcasts, number of receiving sets, etc.

If you can effect an entrance into Vichy-controlled territory, your observations there should follow in general the same line as those above referred

-2-

to, including any information regarding military matters, such as airfields, etc. Obviously, it is more important from our standpoint to have information bearing upon conditions in the Vichy colonies than elsewhere. In this instance, your report on all the above matters should include an estimate of how large a force of occupying white troops could live off the country along the southern fringe of the Sahara, etc., together with any procurable general data on mineral deposits in the regions surveyed.

It would no doubt be most helpful to you to establish contact with any Pan American Airways representatives in that portion of Africa.

D.B.:

Here are a few suggestions the latter
group will suggest ~~about~~ to AD
Ethiopia

percentage of literacy —
newspapers & periodicals circulated —
languages spoken, other than national
dialect —

principal exports and imports under
war time conditions

Racial, political, social, economic divisions
in the populace —
causes and instances of disagreement or
discontent

division on principal personalities white &
black, with particular attention to
(a) democratic sympathies
(b) amenability to "approach"
(c) ^{personal} ambition

Dear, Armand

November 24, 1941

Mr. Frank B. Jewett, President
National Academy of Sciences
Constitution Ave. & 21st Street
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Jewett:

Mr. Armand Denis is leaving very shortly for the Belgian Congo and French Equatorial Africa, hoping to make arrangements there for the capture, care, and shipment of a group of gorillas. These animals are destined to be used as breeding stock in the anthropoid ape breeding station which Mr. Denis is organizing in Florida.

This office is interested in Mr. Denis' trip to Africa. We would greatly appreciate your seeing Mr. Denis, and, after having heard any details of his project which you may care to ask him, giving him whatever letter you think would facilitate his obtaining permits for capture, etc. from the Belgian and Free French authorities.

I hope you will consider the interest of this office as extremely confidential.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

AD:CC

November 24, 1941

Honorable Arthur Gomez
Circuit Court of Florida
Miami, Florida

Dear Judge Gomez:

Circumstances have arisen that make it important for Mr. Armand Denis to go to Africa as quickly as possible on a scientific mission in which this office has a vital interest. I understand that he is engaged in a law suit which is now before your Court. If you could see your way clear to grant any reasonable request for delays which it may be necessary for Mr. Denis to ask of you, I can assure you that it is my belief that such action would be justified as being in the public interest.

I would appreciate it if you would treat this statement as to the interest of this organization in Mr. Denis' trip as being highly confidential.

Sincerely yours,

DB/me

William J. Donovan

Suggested letter to be written by the President
to Mr. Denis:

Mr. Armand Denis
Denis-Roosevelt Expeditions, Inc.
608 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Armand:

I hear that you are leaving for Africa
to obtain gorillas for your anthropoid breeding
station, in which I take a very keen interest.

I trust that your trip will be suc-
cessful and hope to hear your account of it on
your return. I also hope that you will make a
new film of Africa as fine as those that you
showed at the White House.

Sincerely yours,

November 24, 1941

Mr. Basil O'Connor
120 Broadway
New York, New York

Dear Basil:

Mr. Armand Denis is leaving very shortly for the Belgian Congo and French Equatorial Africa, hoping to make arrangements there for the capture, care, and shipment of a group of gorillas. These animals are destined to be used as breeding stock in the anthropoid ape breeding station which Mr. Denis is organizing in Florida.

This office is interested in Mr. Denis' trip to Africa. We would greatly appreciate your seeing Mr. Denis, and, after having heard any details of his project which you may care to ask him, giving him whatever letter you think would facilitate his obtaining permits for capture, etc., from the Belgian and Free French authorities.

I hope you will consider the interest of this office as extremely confidential.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

November 24, 1941

Dr. Roy Chapman Andrews
American Museum of Natural History
Central Park West and 79th Street
New York, New York

Dear Dr. Andrews:

Mr. Armand Denis is leaving very shortly for the Belgian Congo and French Equatorial Africa, hoping to make arrangements there for the capture, care, and shipment of a group of gorillas. These animals are destined to be used as breeding stock in the anthropoid ape breeding station which Mr. Denis is organizing in Florida.

This office is directly interested in Mr. Denis' trip to Africa. We would greatly appreciate your seeing Mr. Denis, and, after having heard any details of his project which you may care to ask him, giving him whatever letter you think would facilitate his obtaining permits for capture, etc. from the Belgian and Free French authorities.

-8-

I hope you will consider the interest of
this organization as extremely confidential.

Sincerely,

DB/me

William J. Donovan

all

DENIS HOOVERLYT EXPEDITION INC.
408 FIFTH AVENUE
NINTH FLOOR
NEW YORK
ANYTIME 1940

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19 41

Colonel William Donovan
Office of the Coordinator of Information
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

In accordance with our agreement, I am sending you a memorandum on myself and my personal reasons for planning an African trip.

This memo purposely does not cover the subject matter of our recent conversation, namely the services which I could be able to render in the course of such a trip. I am covering this in this letter.

After investigation and thought since our conversation, I still think that entrance at Leopoldville and the carrying out of the trip as outlined in the accompanying memo would give me the best chance. I can establish the best possible contacts there, and obtain a great deal of information not only about the territory West of Nigeria under Free French control, but also about the territory West of Nigeria from which I understand that refugees are constantly arriving at Brazzaville. Also, if an effective plan can be worked out for an investigation of the Western territory, either of proceeding inland from Chad or along the coast, I think that this plan must be worked out in Brazzaville.

My interest in securing a supply of anthropoid apes would justify continuing investigations almost to Senegal; certainly as far as Liberia and French Guinea; the larger number of chimpanzees reaching this country recently have come from Freetown.

No better motive I think could be found to explain my activity in Africa. I would be greatly helped by carrying letters from the heads of our foremost national scientific

I am also sending you some material concerning
China, as the material is of interest to you.
I am sending you this letter in the hope that
myself only. I am sure that you will have
investigation in all parts of my country.
no over, that such an investigation will be
making.

... ..

Handwritten: *Handwritten*

DENIS ROOSEVELT EXPEDITIONS INC.
 805 FIFTH AVENUE
 NINTH FLOOR
 NEW YORK
 BRUNNEN 8-4400

Colonel William Donovan
 Office of the Director of Intelligence
 Washington, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Armand Denis is a producer and director of travel and adventure films, including "The Last of the Mohicans" (covering 40,000 miles of travel with a record 22 stops in the African continent, including two transcontinental crossings from Gibraltar to Mombasa and two crossings of the Sahara), "Dark Rapture" (11 months in the Belgian Congo, "Kivu" (made for the Belgian government in the film "The National Park and the gorilla observation in the Belgian Congo, etc.

Denis was formerly a citizen of Belgium, was educated in Europe, came to the United States in 1935. He married Della Roosevelt. Together they are the organizers and leaders of the Denis-Roosevelt African Expedition, the Denis-Roosevelt Asiatic Expedition, etc.

Denis conceived and is at present organizing a scientific breeding station for the anthropoid apes - chimpanzee, orangutan, gorilla - which he is establishing in Florida. There he proposes to breed the anthropoid apes on a scale sufficient to assure an independent and permanent supply of the anthropoid apes which, because of their resemblance to the human, are of great value to science. Scientific institutions are greatly interested in his project: it is hoped that expansion of the breeding station will permit a considerable extension of the use of anthropoid apes in many fields of medical and other scientific research.

Denis has already acquired a substantial number of chimpanzees, and this number is being added to as animals become available for purchase. But imports from Africa have practically ceased; and Denis feels that to secure an adequate breeding stock of chimpanzees and especially to secure an adequate breeding stock of gorillas, special arrangements for capture, care, and shipment must be made in the districts of origin in Africa.

Specifically, Denis proposes:

To travel to Leopoldville, there resume long established friendly contacts with the Governor General of the Belgian Congo and the Belgian Congo officials, obtain from the

authorities (if possible) to be made in the case of gorillas in the Belgian Congo; Denis has recently reported discovery of gorillas in the Mayumbe and in Portuguese Angola; if available, investigate these reports in Mayumbe and in Portuguese territory;

to establish the feasibility of making relations with the French colonial officials in Brazzaville (the Denis Roosevelt Expeditions twice visited French Equatorial Africa from Belgian Congo to Lake Chad, with warm recommendations and blessings from French African leaders, and were well known to all local officials); to obtain the necessary permits for the capture and export of gorillas; to visit by automobile a number of widely scattered districts of French Congo, Gabon and the Cameroons (gorillas are reported in large areas of these provinces, but numerous local conditions would affect the selection of a hunting area); to make detailed arrangements for the capture, transportation and shipment of gorillas - this to be done on a subsequent trip undertaken for the purpose; to locate and inspect, in the course of this survey, a group of 13 gorillas believed to have been captured within the last year by an American animal collector named Carroll (who recently brought 8 young gorillas to this country) and which are believed to be in captivity in the Gabon.

Denis proposes to take with him, as usual, complete professional moving picture equipment and a professional operator. These, apart from their obvious uses, often prove very valuable in securing local cooperation.

Humand Fawcett

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/06 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100460001-3

and Libya as the natural line of defense of Africa against invasion from the North; if this line is breached or broken, the continent of Africa, Egypt and Soudan, is open to the North.

Long this line of defense are water, fertile lands, human population, access to food, and hard ground and open country in which it is not so easy to build and maintain. It is almost inconceivable that it could be attacked successfully by modern means from the North.

If this line is the natural line of defense of Africa, it is the natural line of defense also of the world, and it is important to us in such. It is important to us in another way: Long this line lies the natural line of defense from North and South America to India, Japan and the Far East. It is regrettable that for the bulk of its length it lies in Vichy-French territory - not only populated territory which encloses four separate African areas - Nigeria, the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, Liberia... Only a few hundred French people live in these Vichy-controlled areas South of the Sahara; of these of course few are permanent settlers; and they are said to be very generally in secret sympathy with de Gaulle. One wonders whether there is not a hope that these people may renounce their Vichy allegiance and throw in their lot with de Gaulle and their British neighbors.

Armand Hemm

DENIS, ARMAND

November 17, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

Armand Denis, of Denis-Roosevelt Expeditions, Inc., is prepared to go to Central Africa as soon as transportation and other arrangements can be made. His ostensible purpose will be to make a reconnaissance for a future motion picture, and to study and purchase anthropoid apes. He is particularly familiar with, and well-known in, the Belgian Congo and French Equatorial Africa, where he is widely recognized as a photographer, motion picture producer, and naturalist.

In order to effect the purpose we have in view, it is recommended that he be furnished transportation from New York to Africa and return for himself, and possibly also for a cameraman. In addition, he would be given a lump sum of \$5,000 to cover all his expenses and compensation from his departure until his return to the United States (as well as those of his cameraman, if he is so accompanied) for which no accounting would be required. He would undertake to stay in Africa a minimum of one month.

The President

Page 2

His mission would be to observe German espionage and military activity; the attitude of the native chiefs of the Belgian Congo and French Equatorial Africa; the stability of the Free French; the industrial production and development, as well as the movement of products of the Belgian Congo. All of this is with a view to testing German intention in Central and South Africa.

Respectfully,

William J. Donovan

The President

The White House

DENIS-ROOSEVELT EXPEDITION INC
405 FIFTH AVENUE
SUITE 2000
NEW YORK
ANYTIME 24-HOUR

Please Answer *AKS*

gull

NOV 18 1941

November 17th, 1941

Colonel William Donovan
Office of the Coordinator of Information
25th and E Street
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:-

In our conversation of yesterday, you
showed such interest in my anthropoid ape project,
that I think you will enjoy the enclosed.

I am preparing the memoranda you requested.

Yours very sincerely,

Armand Denis

ARMAND DENIS

Enc.

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AM IN NEWYORK ON SHORT VISIT CAN BE REACHED BY PHONE BRYANT 9-4400
DURING BUSINESS HOURS AND BY MAIL OR WIRE AT 608 FIFTH AVENUE
CAN FLY WASHINGTON ANY TIME REGARDS=
ARMAND DENIS.

608. ALSO 9-4400.

ANTHROPOLOGICAL RESEARCH, INC.

ARMAND DENIS, who originated the project discussed herein, is the well-known explorer and producer of native and wild animal films; leader of the Denis-Roosevelt African Expedition, and the Denis-Roosevelt Asiatic Expeditions; producer of "GOONA-GOONA", "WHEELS ACROSS AFRICA", "DARK RAPTURE", "KIVU", "WHEELS ACROSS INDIA"; director of Frank Buck's "WILD CARGO", etcetera.

He has proved himself a good showman; his pictures have been good popular entertainment aimed at the general public; they have had a large distribution and have, without exception, been financially successful. He understands publicity; witness the fourteen pages of pictures in "LIFE", an unsurpassed record, which followed the return of the Denis-Roosevelt African Expedition. But the Denis pictures have been successful without undignified sensationalism and without recourse to faking; they have been endorsed by the highest scientific institutions; "KIVU" was commissioned by King Leopold III and by the Belgian Government; "DARK RAPTURE", while it was a four-star picture on Broadway, is being preserved as an ethnological document of great value.

As a matter of fact, although since 1932 Armand Denis has devoted himself exclusively to exploration, lecturing and motion picture production, his background is that of a scientist and inventor. He had his early schooling in Europe and took part in the first World War in the Belgian Army and with the British

R.A.F. He then studied chemistry and physics, obtained an Oxford degree in chemistry, a research appointment at the Polytechnique in Paris, and a research Fellowship at California Tech, which brought him to the United States. He became specialized in photography, motion picture engineering, the transmission and recording of sound, and was for three years (1930-1932) a member of the Research Department of the Eastman Kodak Company in Rochester, New York. He has an excellent knowledge of all the technical, as well as the creative, phase of film production; - equipment, camera work, sound recording, film processing and printing, editing and titling, etcetera.

He has kept alive his interest in science, and has taken, in the course of his motion picture work, many opportunities to be of scientific service. He has many friends and contacts in the world of science and can count on their sympathetic support.

In view of the nature of the present project, it is of interest also that both Armand Denis and his wife (the former Lilla Roosevelt) have always had the keenest interest in animals and particularly in tamed wild animals.

For a number of years they have maintained a private zoo in Connecticut, and now in Florida. Their motion picture expeditions have always been also animal capturing and collecting expeditions, and they have brought back collections of wild animals from every trip. They have owned almost every type of wild animal pets, including orang utan, many gibbons, and a number of chimpanzees.

They have for years made a hobby of visiting zoos, and in the course of expeditions and lecture tours have become familiar with practically every zoo in the United States and visited the majority of the zoos of the world. Among their friends are many zoo directors and head keepers, wild animal dealers, game wardens and other officials concerned with wild animal life in many countries. Few people are as intimately acquainted with wild life in its African and Asiatic settings, and at the same time with this same wild life adapted to captivity.

Armand Denis has organized "ANTHROPOID RESEARCH INC." to carry out the following projects: The creation, in a suitable location along the Atlantic Coast of Florida, of a GREAT APE BREEDING FARM; - not a zoo, not an ordinary animal show or a common jungle camp; but a scientific breeding station, devoted to the great apes (chimpanzee, orang utan, gorilla); on an unprecedented scale; under the finest scientific sponsorship and strict scientific supervision.

Scientific work of first importance and of the highest value would be done there; at the same time, however, the station would be designed so as to be thrown open to the public, and so that thousands of visitors could watch the most fascinating phases of its work; and every resource of ingenuity and showmanship would be used to make of the breeding station a successful income producing attraction.

Scientific Aspects.

The scientific value and importance of an anthropoid ape breeding station will indeed be very great. The anthropoid apes are the nearest relatives of man; study of their anatomy and physiology, of their physical, nervous and mental reactions, of their brain and their psychology, has yielded and will continue to yield exceedingly valuable results; experimental medical work on the study and cure of certain human diseases can only be carried out on them; the successful outcome of such work would save countless human lives. Yet the great apes are exceedingly difficult for experimenters to obtain; even in their countries of origin, they are scarce, threatened with extinction, their capture and export are more and more rigorously restricted.

The need has long existed for a breeding station, the assurance of independence from other countries, and of a steady and gradually growing supply of this most invaluable of experimental materials. This need has never been more urgent than it is today, when the small areas of Central Africa and the East Indies where the gorilla and the orang utan are captured may fall under Axis control, and the supply be cut off completely except to German laboratories.

Yale University, about 15 years ago, established an experimental breeding laboratory at Orange Park (Florida) - the only establishment of its kind in the country. There Dr. Yerkes and his assistants have done wonderful pioneering work; they have proved the breeding of great apes to be perfectly possible and practical; but Yale of course could make no attempt to develop an income-producing side to the enterprise and even felt that all publicity should be avoided; and there was therefore, with a limited endowment, no possibility of expansion.

Only if placed on an income-producing basis can such an establishment expand as it should - to the point where this expansion would open new avenues for research, unlimited new possibilities of discovery, in the fields most closely affecting human health and welfare.

Showmanship Aspects.

It is needless to point out that animals are perennially interesting to the public; and that in any zoo the monkeys and apes steal the show. The monkeys, and especially the apes, exert an irresistible appeal, not only because of their strength, their acrobatic ability, their deadpan humor - but mainly because we are aware of their semi-human character; aware that their actions and emotions are those of completely uninhibited and unselfconscious humans.

A large collection of apes, even displayed in the old fashioned way, would in itself be a good attraction. Now if, in such a collection, one of the cages happened to contain a family group, father, mother, and nursing infant, again the family group would steal the show. An ape family group combines every sort of appeal; the contrast of brute strength and gentleness, of ugliness and childish charm, of viciousness and innocence. The amazing exhibitions of mother love, of parental pride, solicitude and concern given by apes, are particularly thrilling, again because they are completely artless and unself-conscious.

Such family groups, in large and spotlessly clean outdoor

cages, would be part of the exhibits of the proposed breeding station; but not however its main attraction. Its main attraction would be a complete departure from the old fashioned method of the zoos and the animal collections, in which the animals are left to their own devices in cages or enclosures, while the public, outside the cages and enclosures, is similarly left to its own devices.

Experience at Orange Park soon showed that not all of the newly born babies could safely be left to the care of their parents or their mother. Sometimes the mother could not or would not nurse her baby; or the baby did not thrive. A department had to be organized for the care and bottle feeding of these infants; it was soon found that the babies who were bottle fed and cared for by humans did better, on the whole, than those left to the care of their mothers; and it has become the rule, rather than the exception, to take the baby from the mother soon after birth and raise it under human care through all the stages of childhood. Now the remarkable fact is that, after much trial and error, the methods which have been evolved at Orange Park for the raising of the ape babies are almost identical with those in use for human babies - in fact, one cannot do better with an ape baby than to treat it exactly, diapers, talcum powder, teething ring and all, as one would a human baby. As a consequence, even the ordinary daily routine of Orange Park is thrilling and full of human interest to a degree which can scarcely be described. In the "nursery", equipped almost exactly like the babies' room in a first class private maternity clinic, a motherly uniformed nurse tiptoes from bassinette to bassinette in which the tiny hairy babies are asleep, looking absurdly helpless

and human; one takes me up to give him his bottle; another has to have his diapers changed, is washed and sprinkled with talcum powder. Every day all are weighed; every night all are measured. Another room is a playroom, where the babies are allowed to crawl and sit up, again under a nurse's supervision. Another room is the exercising room. The whole childhood of the little apes is spent in surroundings reminiscent of the kindergarten and schoolroom rather than the cages and enclosure of a zoo. The whole place, while it was evolved without any idea of showmanship since visitors are not admitted, has acquired, from the contrast between the ape babies and their human surroundings, an enthralling fascination which is impossible to resist.

And, to make a point the importance of which is extreme, this fascination is not only effective on men and children, easy to attract to any animal show, but it is even more effective on women, who notoriously dislike animal shows, but who are completely conquered by the cute babies, and the milk bottles.

The main feature and main attraction of the new breeding station will be the building housing the nursery and all the childhood stages - so designed that while excluded by plate glass from any direct contact with the animals, the public will nevertheless be able to watch intimately all the activities of the station.

After having passed the entrance turnstiles, between the photographic studio and the offices, visitors will find themselves in a large lobby, dimly lighted, along one whole length of which plate glass bays will open into a series of well lighted rooms: the nursery, the babies' hospital, the kindergarten, the playroom, the exercising room, the social-behavior room. Spotless cleanliness

and scientific efficiency and orderliness must be the keynote of the exhibits. No animals are ever to be left in a room without an attendant - a motherly colored woman in the nursery, attractive uniformed girls supervising play, stopping flirts, scolding for lapses (the animals can be and would be trained to use a toilet, partially concealed from the public; to eat at a table, with proper utensils, etc.) in the kindergarten and playroom, etc. In a "psychological study" room, some of the elaborate psychological tests (using mazes or colored light signals; or in which the animals are made to puzzle out the use of simple tools) would be used and demonstrated. A routine would be evolved whereby some scene of interest is going on in each room at all times, while over a loudspeaker a voice would describe the reason and meaning of all the activities in progress. The reason for the elaborate setup in the nursery and the hospital: "These little animals are as valuable to science as any human babies." The reason for the teaching of elementary table manners, of clean habits: "It is good mental discipline, as well as promotes health."

Showmanship will be used in the new breeding station - there will be enough of an atmosphere of science, enough scientific equipment and scientific explanation to make the average visitor feel that he is privileged to watch something normally hidden from him; this will be emphasized by the placing of the visitor in the dark while he looks into well lighted rooms (visitors will be invisible and inaudible to the animals and attendants inside the rooms; sound will be piped when desirable, by microphones from the inside of the rooms to the public in the lobby). It is good show-

manship to emphasize the contrast between the aged and sterile sterilized, clean and hygienic surroundings, their young and greedy nurses, their impersonal scientific attendants. As to the opportunities for using showmanship in connection with the nursery, the bathing, the diapering, the preparation of the milk, the feeding, they are clearly unlimited.

Publicity.

It would be difficult to think of any enterprise which could lend itself better to publicity than the one under discussion. It can be treated seriously because of its scientific aspects and can use all avenues of publicity, including the most exclusive; it has a science angle, a travel and adventure angle, a medical angle, a novelty angle; it has a child angle, a woman's angle, and a tremendous sex angle. There is every reason to think that this enterprise would remain the only one of its kind in the world; it can produce news whenever advisable; it lends itself uniquely to photography, newsreels, newspaper pictures, popular articles and lecturing. Its planning - and of course its opening, can get nation-wide publicity in every available medium.

Buildings.

The new breeding station is being planned with the approval and the sympathetic collaboration of Dr. Yerkes and Dr. Nissen, who have run the Orange Park laboratory for over 15 years and who are generously contributing ideas and the benefit of their long experience.

It was after consultation with them that it was decided to abandon the idea of large outdoor enclosures for the adult

animals, but instead to develop compact, hygienic and efficient cage-blocks for adults; and that the general layout of buildings and outdoor cages was decided upon.

The general layout consists of the following:

Main building (100' x 75', one story).

General office and manager's office

(not open to public).

Main lobby, museum and souvenir shop, photographic

studio, restrooms (open to the public).

Hospital, nursery, kindergarten, playroom,

exercising room, social behavior room

(open to public view).

Isolation room, hospital, kitchen and milk

refrigeration room, special training room,

storage room, attendant's locker room (not

open to public view).

Outdoor adult cage-block for 24 animals (70' x 30').

divided into 16 cages and dens.

Utility building (25' x 50')

Furnace room, watchman's quarters, storage

for portable cages, tools and supplies, garage

for pickup truck.

These buildings and cages suffice to take care of twice as many animals as are considered necessary, from a showmanship standpoint, to make a good start; they have been designed so as to be as flexible as possible, allowing for easy rearrangement and expansion.

Location.

The health of the animals is obviously the first factor to be considered in the choice of a location; it practically dictates that the new breeding station be located in Florida, which combines semi tropical heat with high humidity. The experience of Orange Park has proved that excellent results are possible as far North as the neighborhood of Jacksonville, with occasional artificial heat in winter.

Consideration of income-producing possibilities dictates that the station be located on, or practically on, a main route of tourist travel. Careful study soon narrows the choice to two regions:

1. The immediate vicinity of Miami, which has a slight advantage of climate and has heavy winter crowds; but where a well located large tract of land represents a high investment, the season is very short, the crowd is the gambling, horse racing, night-clubbing type, rather than the sightseeing family type.
2. The North East Coast area; preferably along Federal Highway No. 1 or along the Ocean Highway; where acreage, even along the heavily traveled highway, is cheap; where there is summer traffic comparable to winter traffic (Daytona Beach is the southern limit of summer activity); where both winter and summer crowds are a more leisurely sightseeing type; where local Chambers of Commerce and city authorities offer eager help; and where proximity to Orange Park would make possible a close co-operation between the Yale laboratory and the new breeding station.

Armand Denis has made an exhaustive survey of possible locations along the whole Florida coast, and secured options on half a dozen tracts, up to 100 acres in extent. A decision is about to be made.

Estimated First Cost

Land	\$5,000 - to 15,000.-
Buildings 120,000 cu. ft. at 30¢	\$6,000.-
Equipment and furnishings	10,000.-
Outdoor cages	8,000.-
Parking lot, landscaping, artesian wells, water piping, sewage tanks, heating plant, power	9,000.-
	\$65,000.- to 75,000.-
Purchase of animals and temporary care during construction	30,000.-
Salaries during organization and construction, fees, incorporation and other legal expenses	10,000.-
Special publicity and advertising before opening	10,000.-
	\$115,000. to 125,000.-
One year's operating expenses (including \$10,000. for publicity and advertising)	50,000.-
Total capital required	<u>\$171,000. to 181,000.-</u>

Estimated operating expenses per year.

Director	\$3,000. -
Assistant director	2,400. -
Secretary	1,400. -
Bookkeeper	1,400. -
Ticket seller	1,200. -
6 demonstrators at \$1,200. -	7,200. -
1 lecturer at \$1,400. -	1,400. -
1 keeper (in nursery bldg) at \$1,200. -	1,200. -
1 cook (colored)	800. -
2 keepers (outdoor cages) at \$1,200. -	2,400. -
1 ground superintendent at \$1,200. -	1,200. -
2 colored men at \$800. -	1,600. -
1 tagger in parking lot (colored) at \$600.	600. -
1 night watchman	800. -
Phone, telegraph, mail, office supplies.	1,000. -
Travel and other expenses, director and assistant director	1,200. -
Truck upkeep, gas, oil, general supplies, fuel oil, power	1,300. -
Food, milk and other supplies for animals	3,000. -
Medical	1,500. -
Taxes, insurance	3,000. -
Upkeep on buildings and equipment (5%)	2,500. -
Depreciation " " " "	2,500. -
Publicity and advertising	10,000. -
	<u>\$32,800. -</u>

Estimated returns.

The income to be expected is anybody's guess. The best indication, probably, is the result obtained, after five years of operation, at Marineland (near St. Augustine, Florida) which had, during the last year, over 200,000 visitors at \$1. - admission.

Armand Denis believes that a great ape breeding farm is a better show than any aquarium; that it is easier to publicize and is more of a novelty; that, as planned, it has a tremendous appeal to women which an aquarium lacks; that it is much more difficult to imitate and to duplicate; that it will get repeat visitors more easily than Marineland; that it can be located much more favorably than Marineland, which had to be on the ocean and therefore could not be located at No. 1; and that it will reach the 200,000 visitor mark and a \$200,000.- income in less than five years.

It may be noted that both first cost and operating expense of the great ape breeding farm are only a fraction of the corresponding costs of Marineland.

Confidential - Top Secret

November 17, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

Armand Denis, of Denis-Rosewell Expeditions, Inc., is prepared to go to Central Africa as soon as transportation and other arrangements can be made. His ostensible purpose will be to make a reconnaissance for a future motion picture, and to study and purchase anthropoid apes. He is particularly familiar with, and well known in, the Belgian Congo and French Equatorial Africa, where he is widely recognized as a photographer, motion picture producer, and naturalist.

In order to effect the purpose we have in view, it is recommended that he be furnished transportation from New York to Africa and return for himself, and possibly also for a cameraman. In addition, he would be given a lump sum of \$5,000 to cover all his expenses and compensation from his departure until his return to the United States (as well as those of his cameraman if he is accompanied), for which no accounting would be required. He would undertake to stay in Africa a minimum of one month.

His mission would be to observe German espionage and military activity; the attitude of the native chiefs of the Belgian Congo and French Equatorial Africa; the stability of the Free French; the industrial production and development, as well

as the movement of products of the Belgian Congo.
All of this with a view to testing German intention
in Central and Southern Africa.

Respectfully,

William J. Donovan

The President,
The White House

Mr. Armand Denis

November 21, 1941

Dear Mr. Denis:

I understand that you are prepared to go to Central Africa as soon as transportation and other arrangements can be made for the purpose of studying and purchasing anthropoid apes and to make a reconnaissance for a future motion picture.

In consideration of your undertaking to remain in Central Africa for at least one month to carry out the mission described below, this office will furnish transportation from New York or Miami to Africa and return for yourself and a motion picture cameraman and will pay you the sum of \$5,000. Said sum shall be in full payment for services to be performed by you and the cameraman and in full reimbursement for all expenses which you may incur. No other payments of any kind will be made by this office.

Your mission will be to observe and, where possible, to photograph German espionage and military activity; the attitude of the native chiefs of the Belgian Congo and French Equatorial Africa; the stability of the Free French; the industrial production and development, as well as the movement of products of the Belgian Congo.

If you are willing to undertake this mission on the foregoing terms, will you kindly sign the duplicate original of this letter at the designated place and return it to me.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Coordinator of
Information

Accepted

November 18, 1941. *File*

MEMORANDUM:

From - Colonel Buxton

To - Colonel Donovan.

Subject: Interview with Stephen P. Danforth.

Stephen P. Danforth is a Maine Yankee who has lived for many years in Rio Janeiro, Brazil. For the last eleven years he has been president and general manager of a business located at 46 Rue de Quintanda, Rio Janeiro. Earlier in his life he worked in South America and in Cuba for both the City Bank of New York and the First National Bank of Boston. His present business is the handling of various types of heavy business equipment for South America. He also represents in Brazil the Metals Division of the R.F.C., and his record is on file at the R.F.C. in Washington. I know his cousin, Dr. Murray Danforth, a much respected citizen in Providence.

At present Mr. Danforth is spending the week-end in Washington with Will C. Clayton, Deputy Loan Administrator of the R.F.C., and can be reached through Mr. Clayton on Friday or Saturday of this week. He leaves for Rio December 5th, flying from Miami.

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Mr. Danforth says that the unanimous opinion of representative Americans in Brazil, when talking confidentially to each other, is as follows:

The United States will not secure naval and air bases on the bulge of Brazil until certain politicians have been individually "taken care of". All business in that country is done on this basis and these methods are pursued by all other foreign nations who deal with them, Germany, England, etc. Even in commercial matters, when Danforth and other American business men sell products to the Government they sell through special salesmen who get a much larger selling commission than given to salesmen selling to private concerns or individuals.

Mr. Danforth would not tell me who in his opinion controlled this situation. He knows Brig. Gen. Duke Miller, head of the military mission to Brazil. He knows him very well, and he regards General Miller as thoroughly aware of the true situation. He believes General Miller would know who the key people are. Mr. Danforth knows socially the members of the Cabinet. He says it is well known that the following officials are on our side:

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President Vargas,
 Foreign Minister Aranha
 Minister of Finance
 Minister of the Navy.

Opposed to us are:

Minister of War, Dutra
 Gen. Montiero, Chief of Staff of the Army.

Danforth says that Gen. Montiero, after returning from the United States, told his close associates in confidence that he had a very low opinion of the American Army and thought it was hopeless to oppose German troops with what he saw. He believes, however, that our Navy is second to none. Inferentially this point of view would make him feel that our Navy would protect him from invasion.

Mr. Danforth is of course most anxious never to be quoted or known to have expressed these views. He is a solid, patriotic American who says we might as well know the facts whether we act upon them or not. He believes the best program would be, having found the key men (he might state the names to you, he would not to me; or they might be obtained from General Miller) to invite them North and have them shown distinguished courtesy by high officials of this government. Thereafter, some inconspicuous person should intimate to them that we "take care" of our friends. Mr. Danforth says the methods are many. One is to invite them into a poker game.

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and lose heavily. This saves the honor of the distinguished visitor. Or, he is taken out for a social evening in New York and is inconspicuously handed an envelope and asked not to open it until later. In some cases the transaction might be more openly discussed, Mr. Danforth does not know. He has never himself dealt with any Government official but only through the highly commissioned salesmen. Mr. Danforth would not attempt to estimate what such people would expect but believed that it would be relatively modest considering the matters at stake. He thinks it important that all face-saving devices should be used if base negotiations are made - two flags flying side by side, joint control, joint use - everything to avoid belittling Brazilian forces or people. His opinion also was that he would not transfer the actual consideration until after the grant of the base had been made, but would make the promises specific. I suggest that you explore Mr. Danforth's opinions more fully if you wish to get "local color".

He thought we had been very short-sighted until recently in our economic relations. With other Brazilian-Americans, he believes that we should receive freely all commodities which he calls non-recurring. Cotton and coffee are annually recurring crops; he would not attempt to absorb them, but he believes our present arrangement of taking the

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following materials to be very wise and productive of
good-will:

manganese
chrome
beryllium ore
titanium ore
nickel
cobalt
quartz crystal
mica
rubber

DETEL, WALLACE

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

November 5, 1941

MEMORANDUM TO COLONEL DONOVAN:

Sorry I missed breakfast. My train was forty-five minutes late and, when I got to your house, you had already left.

Here are two minor matters people in New York asked me to bring to your attention:

A Mr. Rogers of the Council for Democracy says he has heard from Father Sheehy and that Father Sheehy says that steps should be taken immediately in respect to certain matters which he had discussed with you. Have you any word for me to give to Mr. Rogers or Father Sheehy?

I.N.S. is planning a series of by-line articles by prominent people for publication, beginning Armistice Day. They hope to get Mr. Knudsen and others of that caliber to write on their several specialities. They would like very much to have you write the first article for the series, to be published Armistice Day. Much of the preparatory work is being done for I.N.S. by Mr. Sidney A. Freifeld. He asked me to ask you if you would do such article. I requested him to give me a brief note on the nature of the article he wants you to do, and promised I would submit the matter to you. You will find his memorandum attached. What shall I tell him?

Wallace R. Deuel

COLONEL DONOVAN SYLVESTER FOR AFFILIATE CAL. HERALD

(800 - 1000 words)

In last war only those in armed forces had a chance to be heroes.

Present day totalitarian war embraces everybody. Civilian front no less important, sometimes more important than actual fighting front (perhaps contrast France vs. England).

Every man, woman and child in nation, therefore, has part to play as opportunity for real heroism.

America's strength lies in a national unity embracing all her diverse national, racial and religious groups. Therefore, this is the focal point of the enemies' attack.

What civilians can do to further National Preparedness program and strengthen morale. In their families, in schools, clubs, communities, they can work to counteract that most potent Nazi weapon - not dive bombers or battleships, but insidious propaganda designed to undermine our national unity and power of resistance by splitting the nation into warring groups, by inciting class hatred - regional jealousies, religious bigotry.

Let's profit from the lesson of Europe, etc.

DONOVAN, LEISURE, NEWTON & LUMBARD
OFFICE MEMORANDUM

To: Col. Donovan
From: JWP
Re: P. Dyer

Date: 10/7/41

There was a fellow Charlie Francis
try to help us in our quest for
proof of not his obligation to in violation
of regulations

He was of some use, but not very
much in view of the time he took and the
small results he accomplished. Not particularly
bright and therefore rather stubborn in his
ideas.

JWP

Dallas, Texas,
September 17, 1941

Mr. Granville Whittlessey Jr.,

New York City, N. Y.

My Dear Sir:

I am making a rather unwarranted request of you which you will feel perfectly free to disregard if it could cause the slightest embarrassment.

I am attaching a letter which I have written Colonel Donovan. It is such a nature that, as you can see from reading it, it is important that it be delivered to him personally. I felt that your office would be sending him his private mail and that this could be included in it.

I thought that you could attach a note to my letter giving him a few facts as to my association at Madison.

Facts outlined in my letter to Colonel Donovan are self-explanatory. Persons associated with politics down here advise me that Mr. Ickes does not pay any attention to recommendations from congressional representatives. It has been impossible to find anyone who has personal contact with Mr. Ickes. So I am resorting to this means in hopes that the Colonel might be able, without too much trouble, to assist me.

I assure you I will greatly appreciate your kindness if you can get my letter to him.

Sincerely yours,

Arthur P. Dyer,
3817 Maplewood,
Dallas, Texas.

Arthur P. Dyer

Shiloh, Texas,
September 17, 1945

Col. William Donovan,

Washington, D. C.

My Dear Colonel:

I realize that in making the request herein contained I am exceeding the bounds of ordinary propriety but there come times when the exigencies of the case require a deviation from the ordinary.

Information has come to me that I am one of three persons being considered by Mr. Ickes for appointment as district coordinator of petroleum marketing for this district. While I have been assured by a number of leading oil marketers in this area, including most of the members of the oil marketing committee appointed by Mr. Ickes, that I would be highly desirable to them in this position, they are not in a position to recommend me. Should I be appointed they would have to deal with me in the future.

I have been advised that Mr. Ickes makes his appointments without congressional suggestion which is highly commendable. However, I understand he does appreciate information from highly regarded sources.

If the opportunity is afforded and you can ethically do so, I am sure that a word from you in the right place would be tremendously effective. If you could place that word I can assure you it would be greatly appreciated.

I assisted your firm in the anti-trust suits at Madison. I worked with Mr. Whittlesey for about two months and testified twice. Before being employed by your firm, I had worked for about a year with Archie Gray of Gulf on evidence in that trial.

I had sixteen years of oil marketing experience before an appointment as assistant to Fred Loge who was State Chairman for Marketing in Texas for the oil industry code under NIRA. On Mr. Loge's resignation I was elected State Chairman. For two years after the code's went out I did public relations work and statistical work for the industry in Texas. My work on hot oil led to my connection with the anti-trust suits. Bernard Meyers will remember the work I did during the code days and at Madison.

I have cast aside my native feelings of embarrassment in asking such a

favor but felt that if you could do anything that would help you would
be glad to. My record of honesty, sobriety and industry will stand the
test.

Messrs Arnott, Alan Jackson, McDowell and many others associated with the
old P. and O. committee of with the Madison trial will give me a favorable
report.

My belief that I could do a real job for the Government and the industry
gives me the nerve to write you.

Sincerely yours

Arthur P. Dyer

Arthur P. Dyer,
3817 Maplewood,
Dallas, Texas.

Dec. 1, 1960

The University Club
1 West 34th Street

Dear Bill,

*See record
Personal - Sullivan*

I spent several days in the
 office, as you know, trying to
 get a notion of its activities there,
 with a view to seeing how I could
 fit into the work. As I told
 you (and to John Kirby in more
 detail) my whole basis of work
 was learned under the State
 Dept. & I would be suited to
 certain concrete jobs in areas
 where I have had experience. I
 drafted a memorandum for John
 which we talked over with
 Mr. Hayden & Mr. Hoover

I gathered from John that he thought it was not a suitable undertaking for the organization at the present time. On the other hand I could not gather that, as yet, any other concrete ideas as to Singapore activities had emerged.

Now, I don't want to be
any embarrassment to you &
I think it best that I settle
right down here in New York,
(where I have always some things
to do) and await a time
when you may feel I am
the man you want for a
specific task.

So please send my warm regards
to the mother & send her our love, &
that in brotherly love.

[illegible]

DAY LETTER

STANDARD FORM NO. 14
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

TELEGRAM

OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

From Mr. W. J. Sullivan

To Mr. W. J. Sullivan

Gen. Agent Mr. Sullivan

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

July 26, 1962

Mr. W. J. Sullivan
50 West State Street
Newport, Connecticut

CAN YOU BE AT MY APARTMENT AT NUMBER ONE HUNDRED PLACE NEW YORK
SATURDAY JULY 26 AT TEN THIRTY TO DISCUSS CURRENT PLAN IN
POSSIBLE HAVE SHIRAZ AND TAYLOR THERE WILL TRY TO MAKE YOU BE
FROM

WILLIAM J. SULLIVAN

WJD:JA

50 West State street
Westport Connecticut
Telephone 8-2396

July 22, 1941

Col William J Donovan
2 Wall street
New York City

Dear Colonel

I passed on your message to Taylor right away, and have now succeeded in reaching Shirer, who was on the road for a couple of days when I first tried to reach him.

There are some things I'd like very much to talk over with you personally as soon as it's convenient to you. I shall have to be in New York some day within the next week or so in any event. Will you be there at any time during that period, and if so might I drop in and see you? If you'd be free, I'd be delighted if you'd have lunch or dinner with me, but you have so many calls on your time that I don't like to ask for too much. All the actual business requires is a quarter of an hour.

The book is almost on schedule, being behind only to the extent that people in Washington asked me to devote time to odd jobs I felt I could not, in all conscience, refuse. I think I'll probably have to take a couple of weeks off when I've finished it, though. I'm too damned tired just now to be much good to anybody.

A newspaper friend in Washington phoned late last night about some other things and said that it seemed your really most important job would be to organize propaganda abroad. I said, "Oh?"

Hope to see you soon.

Yours,

Wassie Daniel